Friendship always either
finds or makes equals.
—Marcus Minucius Felix,
*Octavius* (third century C.E.)

The absence of women,
the presence of the question,
reveals that women call into
question the constitutive myths.
—Anne Norton,
*Reflections on Political Identity*

CHAPTER ONE

# Smoke and Mirrors

## A History of Equality and Interchangeability in Friendship Theory

I begin with a question that philosophers have been asking for centuries: What does it mean for friends to be linked as mirrors of each other? Understood in political terms, can individuals ever be interchangeable or equal, and can we construct a community based on this reflective dyadic unit? As philosopher Paul Ricoeur remarks in his 1992 study of ethics bearing the Aristotelian title *Oneself as Another*, this question is "in no way rhetorical. On it, as [political theorist] Charles Taylor has maintained, depends the fate of political theory"—that is, how we envision community, what constitutes persons and their rights, and the mediating role of others in determining ethical actions (181). Jacques Derrida, who examined the politics of friendship extensively in the late 1980s and 1990s, contends that "friendship is freedom plus equality" and summarizes his complex musings in a similarly deceptively simple question: "Is the friend the same or the other?" (*Politics* 282, 4). Perhaps the crucial issue is not similarity or difference, however we construe these, but a paradoxical postmodern form of both-and, the experience of being "in relation" that is constituted precisely through separation. Near the end of his study of friendship, Derrida quotes approvingly the words of fellow philosopher Maurice

Blanchot, who believed that friends "reserve, even on the most familiar terms, an infinite distance, the fundamental separation on the basis of which what separates becomes relation" (291; *Politics* 294).

Largely left out of this discussion, however, is gender, sexuality, racial identity, and class status. All of these identity markers complicate the vexed questions of sameness, difference, and equality that emerge in representations of friendship. In order to begin to understand how difference and these specific differences and their intersections function within and challenge theories of similitude, I offer in this chapter a history of friendship discourses that highlights tropes of similarity, equality, and interchangeability. Beginning with the preclassical sources for Aristotle's important notion of *philia*, we will see that equality and likeness are requirements for and thus constitutive elements of perfect friendship, which produce a fiction or illusion of interchangeability. Similitude, in different guises, continues to be a force in Christian adaptations of classical ideas; in the Scottish Common Sense philosophers whose theories inform modern notions of sociability, sympathy, and universal benevolence; and in postmodern and feminist conceptions of friendship.

Each age, no matter how different its vision of sociability, politics, or the role of affect, retains a version of dyadic friendship based on adaptations of the Aristotelian idea that "friendship is equality" (*NE* 8:5, 8). Other classical thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle's teacher, and Marcus Tullius Cicero, Aristotle's Roman redactor, produced friendship discourses that shaped particular historical understandings of gender, identity, affect, and politics. As I mentioned in the introduction, the *amicitia* of elite men in the Stoic Ciceronian model underlies early Whig and later American republican notions of homosocial friendship, while Platonic ideas of transcendence shape homosocial friendships of the romantic era and help distinguish them from a sentimentalism increasingly associated with women's bonds. I argue, however, that the perfect friendship of second selves formulated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* exerts the most pervasive hold on our imagination of friendship and democratic politics and provides women and people of color with a conceptual means to produce rhetorical equality. We are then left with a question, the answer to which remains problematic: Can we have equality or equity within difference and differences within equality?

## Classical *Philia* and the Requirement of Equality

By the time Aristotle delivered his great ethical treatises, he had inherited and systematized a long tradition of thought about *philia*.[1] This word—*philotes* in

early Greek writing—has a range of meanings not completely synonymous with its most frequent modern translation as "friendship"; furthermore, writers often referred to more than one of its possible connotations.

As an adjective, *philos* means "dear" or sometimes "own," and as a noun it often connotes a broadly applicable "love." Writers in the preclassical world employed the word in several related ways: to designate the members of one's household to whom one was bound by ties of blood, law, or custom; to describe unrelated people whom one "loves," the meaning nearest to the "elective affinity" of modern friendship; and also to invoke a reciprocal, though not necessarily affective, "trans-generational" relationship known as "guest-friendship," a social institution that afforded hospitality to travelers of similar rank and status (Stern-Gillet 6). Thus, in the *Iliad*, Homer tells of Diomedes, an invading Greek soldier, and Glaucus, a Trojan defending his homeland. Upon entering the area for single combat on the battlefield at Troy, they realize that because their grandfathers were *philoi*, they are also bound by this connection though they are strangers and enemies. In order to publicly signify this status, they agree to exchange armor and to avoid each other's spears (*Iliad* 6:119–282). This practice lends later Greek *philia* its aristocratic character, since the extensive networks of guest-friendship that linked upper-class families within ancient Greece and beyond formed the foundation upon which the organization of the Greek city-state or polis was superimposed (Easterling 15). These powerful and extensive networks enshrined the value of reciprocity in rituals of hospitality, gift-giving, and wishing or doing harm to one's common enemies (a proverbial formulation) but were not necessarily relations of affection or individual choice.

This study focuses primarily on the second meaning of ancient *philia*, a personal relation of affection between unrelated peers. In Homer's works, such affiliation was closely associated with male comrades and family ties. Thus, when King Alcinous questions Odysseus about his sadness upon hearing of the fall of Troy, he asks,

> Did one of your kinsmen die before the walls of Troy,
> some brave man—a son by marriage? father by marriage?
> Next to our own blood kin, our nearest, dearest ties.
> Or a friend perhaps, someone close to your heart,
> staunch and loyal? No less dear than a brother,
> the brother-in-arms who shares our inmost thoughts. (*Odyssey* 8:652–57)

Homer's *Odyssey* also expresses, albeit ironically and in negative terms, the other important principle underlying this notion of *philia*. It occurs when Melanthius,

an arrogant wooer of Penelope, reviles the disguised Odysseus as he and Eumaeus herd she-goats to the feast at Odysseus's house: "'Look!'—he sneered—'one scum nosing another scum along, / dirt finds dirt by the will of god—it never fails!'" (17:236–37). In its positive form, classical writers considered this principle a general truth and cited it extensively. Erasmus includes it in his *Adages* as "God always leads like to like," pointing to its origin in this scene in the *Odyssey* and giving Aristotle's quotation of the proverb "Whence they say 'like will to like'" from book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Adages* I.ii.22, 168–69).

While this important notion suggests a divine or natural origin for human friendship as well as community, it also posits an ineluctable attraction between "likes" that becomes the basis for a principle of exclusion. The great friendship between Achilles and Patroclus depicted in the second part of the *Iliad* and held up by ancient as well as modern sources as the model of "devoted comrades" shows that a specific heroic and moral code had already grown up around dyadic friendships (C. White 14). Learning of Patroclus's death, Achilles calls him *philos hetairos*, "dear comrade . . . the man I loved beyond all other comrades, / loved as my own life" (*Iliad* 18:94–96; Konstan, *Friendship* 41). Through frequent citation, Homer's famous pair reinforces *philia*'s persistently homosocial, suggestively homoerotic, thoroughly masculine, and often military character. Despite these prevailing connotations, scholars speculate that friendships between women existed in early Greek culture and elicited similarly eroticized language, though we have little evidence of it except for the surviving poetic fragments of Sappho (Easterling 18–20; Konstan, *Friendship* 47–48).

Although Homer couches his preclassical example of "symbiosis" and "alter egos" in metaphors of physical similarity and interchangeability, Patroclus was not, according to Nestor, Achilles' equal in lineage or strength (*Iliad* 11:939–40). Familial obligation also shaped their connection. But as in the example of Alexander and Hephaestion discussed in the introduction, this "inequality" reveals an important aspect of *philia*. A few years older, Patroclus was adopted into Achilles' household as a youth and eventually became Achilles' "squire" (Stern-Gillet 16; Konstan, *Friendship* 40). Rules of hospitality, long acquaintance, and mutual affection and the exigencies of war coalesced to form this powerful bond (C. White 15).

The discrepancy in the heroes' status and Achilles' fervent expressions of love and grief over the death of Patroclus have led ancient and modern commentators to speculate about the homoerotic/pederastic nature of this early representation of friendship.[2] According to classical scholars, there is no evidence that erotic pederasty as later practiced in fourth and fifth century B.C.E. Athens existed in this early

period (Konstan, *Friendship* 38), though this does not rule out behavior later labeled homosexual. Athenian pederasty clearly defined the roles of *erastes* (lover) and *eromenos* (beloved) as complementary and unequal: the older man desiring, teaching, and being sexually "active," and the beautiful youth receiving, learning, and being sexually "passive."[3] According to Aristotle, *erastes* and *eromenos* take pleasure in different things and, thus, are not equal and cannot be friends (*NE* 8:4, 6). Writers in this period described the roles of friends as "symmetrical" and saw friendship requiring mutuality and equality. A "jingle" thought to have originated with Pythagoras in the sixth century B.C.E., which later writers associated with his ideas, expresses these crucial characteristics: *philotes isotes* ("friendship is equality"), wittily rendered as "amity is parity" (Konstan, *Friendship* 38–39).

Pythagoras, like other early pre-Socratic philosophers, understood *philotes* as a principle operating in a vast context; in fact, he considered it the essential quality of the cosmic sphere. Although much of what we know about this legendary figure remains speculative, the innovative practical ethics and philosophical ideas, distilled in *acusmata* or *symbola*—oral maxims or sayings—and attributed to Pythagoras by later writers, strongly influenced the shape of classical friendship doctrine. A mathematician, astronomer, and musician trained in Persia and Egypt, Pythagoras was said to have founded an academy at Croton in southern Italy, whose inner circle, known as "Pythagoreans" and *mathematici* (advanced students), lived and studied communally, sharing all possessions, following a restricted diet, and seeking intellectual, moral, and physical excellence. Less stringent rules applied to the "Pythagorists" and *acusmatici* (probationers), members of the society's outer circle who did not live and study communally but received oral teaching. All members were bound by strict rules of secrecy and loyalty. There is no agreement on how large this school was, how far Pythagoras's influence spread, or how long it lasted. We do know that both men and women were members of the society, and several women followers became eminent philosophers in their own right (Iamblichus 259).

In his *De vita pythagorica*, composed as an introduction to a ten-volume study of Pythagoras's thought, the second-century C.E. Neoplatonist Iamblichus credits Pythagoras as the "discoverer and legislator" of a broad concept of "friendship" or universal harmony that governed relations between gods and humans, humans and each other, and humans and animals, as well as the "opposite powers concealed" in the human body (227). The governing principle in these related spheres was a striving for balance and a numerically based harmony through the avoidance of passion, dissension, and vice. Describing the "highest virtue," chapter 33 of *De vita pythagorica* begins by recommending "Friendship of all with all"

(227). While this ideal theoretically included everyone, reports suggest that the Pythagoreans practiced among themselves a radical mutuality, unselfishness, and loyalty that extended even to society members unknown to them but avoided relations with outsiders whom they considered immoral. These principles were epitomized in dramatic stories of emblematic friendship, most famously in the tale of Damon and Phintias (or Pythias), whose unswerving loyalty, discussed below, translated into physical interchangeability. The adage *koina ta ton philon*, "Friends have all things in common," repeated by later writers on friendship, expresses the principle of *koinonia* practiced by the *mathematici*. The "jingle" *philotes isotes* may also have referred to the society's practice of sharing property, but for later writers like Aristotle, it encapsulates the requirement of similar status, virtue, and temperament for the perfect friendship.

Other classical writers attributed to Pythagoras the popular image of the friend as a "second self" and the idea that in friendship, many become one. Because he envisioned friendship extending "to all," Pythagoras is said to have advanced a more humanitarian ideal of association—*philanthropia*, "the love of many"—than that which prevailed in Greek thought (C. White 19). His practice, to the extent we can determine it, implied that intimate relations of choice and mutuality best created the conditions under which humans could achieve "some kind of mingling and union with God, and . . . communion with intellect and with the divine soul. For," Iamblichus concludes in chapter 33, "no one could find anything better, either in words spoken or in ways of life practiced, than this kind of friendship. For I think that all the goods of friendship are embraced by it" (235). It is not surprising that the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus was a strong influence on early Christian thought.

By the time of Socrates, an ideal of friendship emerged as a primary personal connection that was separate from the exchange relations of marriage and commerce and vitally concerned the moral character and disinterested actions of the partners. This view of *philia* as a primarily affective affiliation revises the predominant view of classical scholarship, which holds that the Greeks understood friendship as a broadly applicable affiliation, deeply embedded in economic relations, while the Romans understood it in a narrowly political sense, shorn of emotion. Classicist David Konstan counters that despite cultural differences like the inseparability of economics and interpersonal relations and divergent notions of selfhood, Greek and Roman writers recognized a "domain of human sympathy" analogous to modern conceptions in which a specific facet of friendship operates. He makes this case philologically, distinguishing the broad meaning of the abstract noun *philia*, which like the verb *philein* connotes love and affection, from

the concrete noun *philos* (plural: *philoi*), which means "friend" in a specific and restricted sense (and is not to be confused with the adjective *philos*, which when applied to family members means "dear") (*Friendship* 55–56).

The drama of the period, focusing on the lives of the Greek elite, illustrates the multiple meanings of friendship but also offers an example of dyadic male friendship that becomes as proverbial as the love of the Homeric heroes or Alexander and Hephaestion. In a tense scene from Euripides' *Orestes*, Orestes and his sister Electra, fearing Menelaus's vengeance for the murder of their mother Clytemnestra, resign themselves to suicide. Electra portrays their sibling connection with the words and imagery of *philia*, calling Orestes "[m]y dearest, you who have a name that sounds most loved and sweet to your sister, partner in one soul with her!" (1045–46). They are interrupted by Pylades, Orestes' childhood companion and comrade in war and matricide, to whom he has betrothed Electra "from a deep regard for [Pylades'] companionship" (1080), thus closing the circle of kin and friends. Bound by love and honor as well as by obligation, since he regards Electra as a wife, Pylades invents a plot to save them all. And when Pylades refuses to part from his friend, even in adversity, misfortune, and death (1095), Orestes extols the immeasurable value of intimate friendship between virtuous men: "Ah! there is nothing better than a trusty friend, neither wealth nor monarchy; a crowd of people is of no account in exchange for a noble friend" (1155).

In the *Lysis*, an early dialogue and the only one that focuses specifically on friendship, Plato depicts Socrates as failing to define the concept, though he declares his lifelong "passion" for "possessing" friends (Pakaluk, *Other Selves* 12). The dramatic setting of this dialogue is revealing. On his way from "the Academy straight to the Lyceum," Socrates is waylaid by Hippothales, an older man who insists that they stop at a new wrestling school to see his current favorite, the young Lysis. Lovesick and ridiculed by his companions for obsessively singing "unoriginal" poetic odes about his *enamorato*, which Ctesippus compares to "old women's spinning-songs," Hippothales asks Socrates to "demonstrate" how an *erastes* should approach his *eromenos*. Socrates agrees, and meeting Lysis and his age-mate Menexenus, another son of the nobility, leads them through a dizzying consideration of many of the commonplaces about friendship in circulation at the time: that friends have everything in common, that friends are primarily useful to one another, whether it is better to love or be loved, whether like is drawn to like or the opposite, whether friendship is reserved to the good, and finally, what is the nature of desire. While Plato may be merely clearing the ground for his later discussions of eros, his presentation of friendship as "aporetic" may be the point: like Socrates, we are forced by the desire of others out of our direct route and must

accept that there is no one definition of friendship, a possibility supported by the different meanings of the word ("dear," "fond," and "friend") Socrates implies throughout (Price 14, 6–7).[4]

Furthermore, the detour Socrates takes, drawn by Hippothales' embarrassing pederastic desire, leads him to a pair of young friends who, upon close examination, are equals in all things and thus have what Socrates calls, somewhat incongruously given their youth, the "experience" (as opposed to the knowledge) of friendship. In questioning the pair about their experience in order, ostensibly, to determine "how one person becomes the friend of another" (Pakaluk, *Other Selves* 13), Socrates enacts a form of pedagogy-as-friendship, which stands in stark contrast to Hippothales' "gross misuse of language and music" (6). It is important to note that in fifth century B.C.E. Athens, erotic friendship between men coexisted with heterosexual marriage and the fathering of children as a carefully regulated set of pedagogical, pederastic, and social structures that linked young boys of the ruling class to older men who shaped them into citizens. Such strictly complementary erotic relations were meant to lead to a higher spiritual communion and the contemplation of the highest Good through Beauty.[5] The view emerging from the *Lysis*, as well as from Plato's later dialogues and letters, equates male bonds with the process and end of philosophy itself. Thus, the "utility" of friends has a higher function in Plato's view. And desire, arising from lack or loss, becomes a search for what is *oikeion*—that is, closely related to and like the self (C. White 23). Still, friendship is not an end or good in itself, as it would be in Aristotle's thought. In perhaps the only concrete assertion in this inconclusive dialogue, Socrates tells the youths that men are drawn to friendship in search of a dimly remembered "first principle" or "first friend," which is "truly a friend," while all the rest "may be deceiving us, like so many phantoms of it" (Pakaluk, *Other Selves* 23).

Plato's student Aristotle rejected pederastic friendship for a vision of *philoi* no less intensely connected but who were relative equals of long acquaintance. He places his discussions of friendship at the heart of his ethical system because *philia* is inseparable from his vision of social and political organization. Not only does he argue that sociability is an inherent human trait, but he asserts that "city-states too are held together by friendship, and that lawmakers are more concerned about it than about the virtue of justice," because civic "concord" resembles and flows from the highest form of individual friendships. Thus, Aristotle states at the beginning of book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "[I]f people are friends there is no need for the virtue of justice, yet if they are just they still need friendship. Furthermore, among [types of] just actions, that which is most just is thought to

be characteristic of friendship" (*NE* 8:1, 1). Aristotle refers to the highest form of friendship, which I call "perfect" or "ideal" friendship, to be distinguished from two lesser types, friendship that produces something useful, such as cooperation, and friendship that produces pleasure, such as leisure and companionship.[6] The two lesser friendships are instrumental processes (*kinesis*), what Aristotle calls "accidental." By contrast, the perfect or ideal friendship, which might include the two lesser types, is an intrinsically valuable, ongoing activity (*energeia*) whose end is the realization of individual human potential ("happiness") as well as the generation and maintenance of "the highest good of all"—the city (Stern-Gillet 42–46).[7]

Emphasizing two crucial requirements for the achievement of friendship's highest form—voluntary, rational choice and an equality between friends that makes such choice possible—Aristotle offers a definition that has dominated the long philosophical and popular discourse: "a friend is another self" (*philos allos autos*), so that "Equality—and likeness—is friendship, and especially the likeness of those alike in virtue" (*NE* 9:4, 29; 8:8, 12).[8] Philosophers have taken this to mean that what Aristotle understands as self-love is the best model for love of another, but to understand this we need to recognize that Aristotle has a notion of selfhood and self-awareness that differs significantly from modern conceptions.[9]

Aristotle's unsystematic account of selfhood begins with sense perception and turns outward to the ethical and social, rather than proceeding from self-awareness, as in the Cartesian notion of subjectivity, and turning inward to the personal and introspective (Stern-Gillet 15–16, 22–23). People, in Aristotle's view, strive for *eudaimonia* (happiness, well-being) by exercising the active principle or *nous*, variously translated as "intellect," "understanding," and "spirit," in imitation of the divine. While God is completely self-sufficient (*autarkia*)—"Thought that thinks itself"—humans can achieve self-awareness only indirectly through mediation by an other (Aubenque 25). Thus, friendship provides cognitive access to self-awareness that leads to moral "actualization" as friends perceive and know together (Stern-Gillet 54–55).

In the *Magna Moralia*, Aristotle offers the analogy of the mirror: "And so, just as when wishing to behold our own faces we have seen them by looking upon a mirror, whenever we wish to know our own characters and personalities, we can recognize them by looking upon a friend; since the friend is, as we say, our 'second self' " (2:15.7, 683).[10] Likewise, Cicero argues in his treatise on friendship in the Roman world that the highest virtue and best life can be achieved only in society. Human sociability, he speculates, was the invention of "nature," which hoped "that since virtue when solitary cannot arrive at the highest kind of life, it might do

so when joined and shared with a companion" (xxii.83; 81). Thus, Cicero concludes, "the man who keeps his eye on a true friend, keeps it, so to speak, on a model of himself" (vii.23; 56).

Furthermore, in the Aristotelian scheme, the quality of the object contemplated determines human self-awareness. To obtain the most accurate self-knowledge logically requires that we contemplate an other that is most nearly identical to ourselves. Since Aristotle regards virtue as the quality most necessary for moral development, the friend who will most accurately reflect oneself is someone equal or similar in virtue. These friends don't "complete each other," as do the divided halves of the man/woman in the myth of love Aristophanes relates in Plato's *Symposium*. Aristotle's perfect friendship differs significantly in that these friends choose to join themselves to each other, while the Platonic lovers have no control over their division or the urge that irresistibly draws them together (Heller 11). By contrast, good men love the good in themselves, as they should according to Aristotle, and they freely choose a friend who reflects a similar good. When such friends find each other—a relatively rare occurrence, by all accounts—they desire to live together and share everything in common and will risk their lives for one another, since the love of *philoi* desires above all the highest good humanly possible for the friend (*NE* 8:3, 4–5; 9:8, 36). "Desire," Agnes Heller concludes, "enters the world and the works of friendship through freedom" (11–12).

For these reasons, Aristotle and many thinkers up to the early modern period considered friendship the most dignified form of human connection, ennobling and tempering the self through a voluntary, mutual affiliation. Laelius, the speaker of Cicero's *De amicitia*, begins with a declaration that rings with the force of common sense and popular wisdom: "All I can do is to urge you to put friendship ahead of all other human concerns, for there is nothing so suited to man's nature, nothing that can mean so much to him, whether in good times or in bad" (v.17; 53). Next to this, heterosexual erotic love, which was thought to be marked by the inequality and, hence, asymmetry of the lovers, or heterosexual marriage, also asymmetrical on account of gender, are forms of imbalance, even insanity as the Stoic philosopher Seneca wryly observes: "Beyond question the feeling of a lover has in it something akin to friendship; one might call it friendship run mad" (Letter IX, 49). On this understanding, the ideals of self-sufficiency and friendship, which seem at first contradictory, prove to be mutually reinforcing.

For his understanding of equality and similarity, Aristotle draws on well-established tradition—Pythagoras and Empedocles—that advances resemblance and unity as central principles of human consciousness. According to some scholars, this

tradition indicates a fear of difference and diversity in Greek thought.[11] In his discussions of equality as a physical characteristic, Aristotle asserts in the *Physics* (7:4) that things that are equal can be different and that all relations of equality are symmetrical. Here, as in the *Metaphysics*, he classes equality and inequality with the terms "like" and "same" and explains that "things whose substance is one are the same, whose quality is one are like, and whose quantity is one are equal" (von Leyden 27, 33).[12] In his discussion of friendship, Aristotle uses the term "equality" in relation to justice and to denote political standing and shared interests and links types of friendships found in "households" with different political forms.[13] For example, he argues: "[T]he various friendships and justice exist even in tyrannies, but to a small extent, while in democracies they do so to a greater extent, because many things are in common, since the citizens are equal" (*NE* 8:11, 17). Equality in this sense derives from the minimum property qualification (*timema*) for citizenship, which defines the political structure Aristotle calls "timocracy" or "constitutional government" where the propertied majority shares rule and from which democracy, where "everyone . . . is on the same level," "deviates only a little" (8:10, 15).

Although Aristotle considers timocracy and its deviation, democracy, the "worst" political forms, with monarchy the best and aristocracy second, he links them with the friendship type that arises among brothers, also synonymous with the bond between comrades in arms that is closest in description to the highest form of friendship.[14] Because brothers and comrades "have *everything* in common," they are not bound by rules of obligatory reciprocity but share equally, live together, and will die for each other (*NE* 8:9, 13; his emphasis).

In his elaboration of fraternal friendship, Aristotle lists the major features through which similarity can produce the requisite equality or parity: brothers "are equals and similar in age"—that is, of comparable social standing and close in years but clearly not identical. Aristotle cautions, however, that "brotherly friendship will fail to develop when they differ greatly in age" (*NE* 8:10, 15). This suggests that physical aspects of equality are at issue. Furthermore, "such people are usually alike in feelings and in character" (8:11, 16). Putting aside the verifiability of these claims—for brothers can certainly be of different social status and age, contrary dispositions, and opposite sentiments—likeness in these four physical and developmental aspects of life form the ground on which perfect friendship and, by association, democratic structures can be built. These are precisely the categories enumerated by Mrs. Leslie in Grace Aguilar's novel discussed in the opening of my introduction. They are echoed in several of the examples from the early American sources I will examine later in this chapter, except that those examples make gender sameness an explicit criterion.

Implicit in the classical notion of likeness is an essentialized understanding of gender. Although Aristotle cites the powerful love of a mother for her child as the very model of *philia* in which loving and wanting good for the other is more important than being loved and wanting good for oneself, he excludes women from the category of *philoi*, believing them constitutionally incapable of a fully rational, appetite-controlling intellect. Men and women, husband and wife, can achieve a friendship including and transcending utility and pleasure "on account of virtue as well, if they are good, since there is a virtue for each," but these virtues are not the same or equivalent (*NE* 8:12, 19). Rather, marital association "is the same as that in an aristocracy," where a superior group rules "with more good to the better, and assigning what is fitting to each" (8:11, 16). These spheres are clearly gendered: a husband rules "in virtue of his worth," which is determined by his biological sex, but "only over those things which a husband should, and whatever is appropriate for a wife he hands over to her." Wives have dominion in the domestic sphere by virtue of their biological capacities. If the husband oversteps his sphere in a marriage and "dominates in everything, he converts it into an oligarchy" where he rules not by his worth but by force (8:10, 15).

In the case of relations between unequals—between father and son, older and younger men, husband and wife, ruler and subject—Aristotle argues that a compensatory proportionality, or "loving [that] reflects the comparative worth of the friends," can operate to "equalize" the parties (*NE* 8:7, 10; *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Irwin 25). Each party gives and receives what is appropriate to them and their differing "worth." Because the "better" person is more "beneficial" to the lesser person, he loves less and the inferior person loves more. This proportional equality, however, does not operate in the same way even in the closely related areas of justice and friendship, and the difference reinforces the literal, perceptible character of equality in friendship.

In his explanation of this equalizing process, Aristotle observes that in matters of justice, equality based on worth is primary, while equality based on "quantity" is secondary, because such determinations tend to bring differences among people to the foreground in the interests of allotting "goods" (that is, rights or privileges) on the basis of merit. Such equality, however, is practical, expedient, and metaphorical—that is, based on substitutions, additions, and subtractions that produce equity. Thus, proportional worth only approximates the "equality in quantity" or strict equation of virtues, powers, abilities, and sentiments of the friends, approaching a measurable perfection and balance that is proper and necessary to (in Aristotle's words, "seems indeed to be characteristic of") perfect friendship.

This kind of equality tends to "close differences" in its strict accounting and equalizing of the attributes and actions of the friends (*NE* 8:7, 10–11, 95–96).

As many scholars note, Michel de Montaigne adverts to "the common agreement of the ancient schools" on the unfitness of women for ideal friendship, even though Pythagoras admitted them into his academy, presumably on an equal basis (138). While neither Plato nor Aristotle categorically excluded women from friendship, citizenship, or political rule, their human ideal, as Elizabeth Spelman observes, "is above all else a masculine ideal" (54). The ways in which these thinkers perceived women to be different from men—as less innately capable of reason and discipline—are also inimical to classically defined friendship. Exiled domestically and thrown together in male-dominated cultures, women formed relationships with each other, but these could not achieve the visibility or cultural importance of male bonds. A few instances of female and cross-gendered friendships between husbands and wives occur in later Greek romances of the first century C.E., but these depend upon an equality of status, age, and education and the mutual passion of the spouses characteristic of ideal friendship between men (Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry* 7; Hock 161).

In later elaborations of Aristotle's ideas, writers on friendship magnify the equality necessary for perfect friendship into a requirement that restricts it not only to people of the same sex and predominately to men but also to the deceased. The key text is Cicero's *De amicitia*, a treatise on friendship written around 44 B.C.E. during his retirement from public life and after the fall of the Roman Republic. In this dramatic dialogue, Cicero claims to be transmitting his recollection of a conversation with his teacher and role model Q. Mucius Scaevola, who, on the occasion of several highly visible, politically motivated deaths, recalled a conversation *he* had had as a young man with his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius (second century B.C.E.), a Roman general and statesman. Laelius, who had been trained in Stoic philosophy, is the speaker of Cicero's dialogue, which is set just after the untimely death of Scipio Africanus, Laelius's military comrade and lifelong friend.

Through this complicated dramatic framework, Cicero suffuses a topic popular in Greek thought from which he borrowed liberally with a deep yearning for and idealizing of the absent beloved friend and personal/political concord that have come to define the discourse. The murderous political intrigues and the loss of republicanism against which it is set only enhance the "true and perfect" nature of this exemplary connection (vi.22; 56). The dialogue amplifies several key Aristotelian ideas about friendship, such as its requirement of similar aristocratic rank,

temperament, and virtue, and repeats Aristotle's familiar formulation with an added emphasis on the virtuality of equality and merger: "[T]he true friend is, so to speak, a second self. . . . [T]hey become virtually one person instead of two" (xxi.80–81; 80). As Eleanor Winsor Leach points out, in discussing these commonplaces Cicero uses both the language of resemblance (*similitudo*) and the language of doubling (*alter idem*) (12). The "weakness" of women and their need for "protection" from rather than for spiritual mutuality with men prevent their inclusion in such a lofty enterprise (xiii.46; 67).

Centuries later, in the late sixteenth century, Montaigne crafts a romanticized version of Ciceronian friendship discourse in which "distance came to seem a permanent, almost a constitutive, element of friendship" (Weller 504). Montaigne places his essay "De l'amitié" about his "sovereign and masterful" connection with the deceased writer Étienne de La Boétie at the precise center of a collection of essays whose decidedly modern purpose was self-disclosure and self-perpetuation. Thoroughly familiar with the ideas of Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca, Montaigne protests that "the very discourses that antiquity has left us on this subject seem weak compared with the feelings I have" (143). The key term here that makes this an early modern text is "feelings."

Friendship, Montaigne asserts, is the ultimate act of an unconstrained will, so that kinship relations implying "natural" obligation do not qualify. Such friends are not merely bonded but "fused" and "confused"; their "souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again" (139). But there is also a rapturous, erotically charged, consuming violence in this ineluctable force "which, having seized my whole will, led it to plunge and lose itself in his; which, having seized his whole will, led it to plunge and lose itself in mine, with equal hunger, equal rivalry" (139). While Montaigne does not completely rule out the possibility of cross-gender or female friendships, he declares that at the present moment, "the ordinary capacity of women is inadequate for that communion and fellowship which is the nurse [*nourrisse*] of this sacred bond; nor does their soul seem firm enough to endure the strain of so tight and durable a knot" (138). Despite women's current spiritual infirmity, the physically nurturing capacities specific to female anatomy provide Montaigne, as Aristotle, with a figure for an intensely spiritual, melancholic, and exclusively masculine friendship. In the context of this prevailing discourse, striving for the ideal renders women's friendships acts of resistance to assumptions of female difference and inferiority.

Because women are not equal with—that is, not like—men, they cannot function as the mirrors that accurately reflect a man's virtue. This failure, in Virginia

Woolf's acerbic analysis, has been instrumental to the very progress of civilization: "Women," she observes dryly, "have served all these centuries as looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size. Without that power probably the earth would still be swamp and jungle" (35). It is not coincidental that Aristotle's figure of the friend as mirror for the self plays on the double meaning of "reflection" as thought on the one hand and as resemblance or likeness on the other. The psychic symbiosis that for Aristotle signals an intellectual and affective equality, even despite obvious differences, is expressed as a visual likeness and interchangeability that serves to discourage friendship across differences, not only of gender, but also of class and ethnicity. As I mentioned earlier, this tendency appears in the early Homeric accounts of friendship where, for example, the way Achilles' immortal armor perfectly fit his comrade and squire Patroclus expresses the perfect consonance of their minds and hearts, despite their inequality in lineage and strength (*Iliad*, book 16). Patroclus dons this armor when he enters the battlefield before the walls of Troy to fight and die in Achilles' stead. When Hector, the foremost Trojan warrior, kills Patroclus, strips the famed armor from his dead body, and dons the armor himself, he requires divine intervention from Jove and Mars to fill it. Hector's literal unfitness for Achilles' armor signifies his psychological and spiritual dissonance with the Greek warrior-comrades (book 17; Stern-Gillet 16).

Not just resemblance or likeness but the interchangeability of friends becomes the signifier of their perfect connection. This is illustrated in the well-known emblematic story of the Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias, recounted by Iamblichus, who draws on earlier sources who claim to have heard it directly from Dionysius, the deposed king of Sicily and one of the participants. Egged on by jealous "associates," this local tyrant unfairly accuses Phintias of plotting against him and sentences him to death in order to test the Pythagoreans' legendary "dignity, pretended trustworthiness, and freedom from emotion" (Iamblichus 231).

Phintias calmly accepts the sentence, asking only "the rest of the day to settle both his own affairs and those of Damon. For these men lived together and shared all things, but Phintias, being older, had taken on himself the main management of the household"; he appoints Damon as his substitute and "security." Dionysius is amazed that anyone would agree "to become a security for death," but Damon readily agrees, amid the jeers of the false accusers. When Phintias faithfully returns at sunset to suffer his fate, "all were astonished and subdued." Moved by this display of loyalty and trust, Dionysius commutes Phintias's sentence and begs to be included in such a remarkable friendship, but the two Pythagoreans refuse on account of the tyrant's immorality (231).

Iamblichus cites this story to illustrate the importance of selecting friends carefully and the Pythagoreans' strict avoidance of affiliation with outsiders (229). Striking is the representation of "communalism," which Iamblichus invokes in its proverbial form (the men "lived together and shared all things") but apparently also applies to a pair of men of different ages and divergent responsibilities. Despite these inequalities, perfect friendship allows one person to substitute, even to the death, for the other.

In another version of the story, included by the first century C.E. historian Valerius Maximus in his collection *De Amicitiae Vinculo*, a compilation popular in the Middle Ages, the writer does not even specify who is arrested and who stands security, nor does he mention the men's difference in age. The friends, who are mere abstractions and representatives of Pythagorean practice, have become truly interchangeable while the friendship itself is held up as a heroic ideal. In contrast to Iamblichus, Maximus draws a moral that emphasizes "the powers of friendship . . . to humanize cruelty, . . . to which powers almost as much veneration is due as to the cult of the immortal gods" who ensure "public safety," because on friendship "does private happiness depend" (book 4, ch. 7; qtd. in Carpenter 33–34).

Cicero cites an even more extreme case of interchangeability in *De amicitia* when Laelius recalls a Roman audience's wild applause during the performance of a play by his friend the playwright Marcus Pacuvius that enacted the exemplary friendship of Orestes and Pylades discussed above. In Pacuvius's version of the Greek tragedy, when Orestes is sentenced to death for killing his mother, he and Pylades are captured and brought before the king, who "did not know which man was Orestes; thereupon, Pylades declared that he was Orestes, so that he might die in Orestes's place; but Orestes insisted that *he* was Orestes, as indeed he was" (vii.24; 57). The resemblance, interchangeability, and willingness of friends to sacrifice themselves for each other become dominant features of chivalric romance and set pieces in friendship narratives. James Fenimore Cooper, for example, includes a similar scenario in *The Last of the Mohicans*, the subject of chapter 4, in which the impetuous young American major, Duncan Heyward, thinking to protect Hawk-eye from his enemies, claims to be the famed sharpshooter. A spectacular display of marksmanship identifies the men—in both senses of this word—that is, simultaneously distinguishing them and confirming their true identities but also more nearly con/fusing and aligning them in terms of wilderness "gifts" and loyalties (295–300). In Cicero's treatment, Laelius declares emphatically that the Roman audience's unstinting approbation of the nobility of *amicitia* "is all I can tell you of my feelings about friendship" (vii.24; 57).

## Christian Fellowship, Medieval Chivalry, and Renaissance Similitude

The moral nature of classical friendship appealed to early Christian thinkers who drew heavily on classical discourses, transposing earthly friendship to a spiritual plane. In terms of individual relationships, the emphasis of Christian friendship shifted significantly from rational desire and shared virtue to affective affinity and spiritual intimacy. However, Christian beliefs produced a more important change, directing believers away from exclusive dyadic friendships to a broader fellowship of the faithful and, finally, in a move reminiscent of the pre-Socratic idea of *philanthropia*, to a "brotherhood" with all humanity. Christian doctrine takes this to its logical conclusion, commanding us to love our enemies, a form of affection outside the pale of classical friendship.

The heady millennial atmosphere of the early church fueled the displacement of restrained dyadic friendship. There, fanaticism promoted an emotionally solidifying identification in a lay following under continual threat. Furthermore, sin, innate depravity, and injunctions to humility rendered human virtue completely dependent on the active work of God; thus, Christianity valued affiliations based not on the recognition of merit or deserts but on an imitation of God's free, equal, and boundless love to all. Early Christianity discouraged "particular" relationships, advocating a universal love enunciated in Jesus' "Golden Rule" and denoted by the use of the words *caritas* (dearness or charity) and *agape* (affection) rather than *philia* or *amicitia* and figured as "fellowship" or "brotherhood."[15]

Jesus himself echoed Greek and Roman thought by valuing friendship over marriage or kinship but routed the "love" of his band of male disciples for each other through his love for them: "This is my commandment, That ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:12–13).[16] Thus, loving each other became a sign of loving God. Unlike *philia* or *amicitia*, *agape* did not require reciprocity or mutuality but forgiveness and bringing others to an experience of it in an expectation of its perfection in the hereafter. And because all people were, theoretically, equal in the eyes of God, social and moral inequalities did not have the same inhibiting force.

Furthermore, the early Christian sexual ethic, which tolerated marriage as necessary in the fallen state, proscribed extramarital relations and extolled celibacy, chastity, and even virginity, encouraging sex-segregated groups like monasteries and nunneries in which homosocial relations flourished. Though Augustine embraced Cicero's celebrated definition of friendship—*omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritae consensio* (complete sympathy in

all matters divine and human with goodwill and affection [vi.21])—and applauded its reverent spirit, he nevertheless regarded individual friendships as pale imitations of the ultimate, always unequal friendship with God (C. White 50).[17] These were not primarily affectionate relations but spiritual bonds in which partners shared confessions of faith and the endless struggle to overcome earthly ties, like kinship, erotic love, and "worldly" friendships, that obscured the spiritual goal of union with the divine.

Two great medieval works on friendship that strive to marry classical and Christian ideas offer important background for the discussion in chapter 2 of the signal American text, John Winthrop's "A Modell of Christian Charitie." Deeply affected in his youth by his reading of *De amicitia*, a twelfth-century Cistercian abbot named Aelred of Rievaulx wrote a treatise entitled *De spiritali amicitia* (Of Spiritual Friendship) that attempts to define friendship for a Christian society. Aelred echoes the pagan writer he so admired in restricting "spiritual friendship" to the "just" and defining it as "born of a similarity in life, morals, and pursuits, that is, a mutual conformity in matters human and divine united with benevolence and charity" (par. 45, 60–61). The difference, he informs his fellow monk and interlocutor in the opening line of the treatise, is that two are never just two: "Here we are, you and I, and I hope a third, Christ, is in our midst" (par. 1, 51). Christ is, simultaneously, the principle of "friendship"—eternal, unconditional, disinterested love—and its fulfillment. Thus, Christian friendship is, paradoxically, unattainable except by Christ but also widely accessible, because everyone can and should aspire to that ideal (Pakaluk, *Other Selves* 129).

Furthermore, Aelred makes the important distinction, reinforced later by Thomas Aquinas, between friendship and the religious practice of charity that shapes the idea of a Christian "commonwealth." He begins by explaining that God created Eve "from the very substance of the man" to "teach that human beings are equal . . . and that there is in human affairs neither a superior nor an inferior, a characteristic of true friendship" (par. 57, 63). But the Fall "caused private good to take precedence over the common weal," corrupting friendship that formerly extended to all but is thereafter restricted to the faithful few. Charity, or universal love, pertains to everyone else, even sinners and enemies to whom "good" persons could never be linked in bonds of friendship (par. 58, 63–64). For Aelred, spiritual friendships are the only "true" friendships, producing "sweetness," the almost bodily or sensory experience of divine unity, and promoting intimacy between people—an intersubjective space in which "we can fearlessly entrust our heart and all its secrets" (par. 32, 58). This notion of interpersonal

intimacy assumes an internal psychic realm that allows for the privatizing and romanticizing of friendship.

Aquinas, the eminent thirteenth-century theologian, extends the discussion of love and charity in the second part of his monumental *Summa Theologiae*, locating it specifically in the context of Aristotle's ideas on friendship from books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which he cites extensively. He argues that charity is based on "communication" or "conversation," imperfect in its earthly form, with God. Thus, "charity is the friendship of man for God" and "extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake" (Pakaluk, *Other Selves* 172–73). A particular kind of vicarious friendship, routed through God, becomes the anchor and guide of a Christian's moral life (148).

While monks wrote to each other in a fairly unrestrained language of spiritual love, another influential discourse of male homosocial bonding arose in the Middle Ages between warrior knights. Emerging as an honor code of the ruling class, chivalry took three distinct and competing forms: military, religious, and courtly, each with its specific literary expression. Warrior knighthood, celebrated in the early *Chansons de geste* and epitomized by the miraculous physical resemblance and beauty of the legendary Ami and Amile, privileged martial skills and exalted epic qualities like heroism, loyalty, and male camaraderie (Langer 234). Roland and Oliver, for example, are one of many pairs of knights attending King Charlemagne in the *Song of Roland*, an anonymous mid-eleventh-century French epic. Their deep love, expressed particularly in Roland's mourning for his fallen comrade, echoes the paradigmatic bond of the Homeric heroes Achilles and Patroclus.

By the fourteenth century, the popular romance of *Amadis de Gaule* was circulating through Europe and featured a similar friendship between Amadis and his brother Galaor. In an episode recalling the scene with Orestes and Pylades from Euripides' play discussed above, the French queen seats the brothers next to each other and asks the ladies of the court to tell them apart. Although they do differ slightly, these details are diminished by "the equalizing effect of knightly perfection," a quality also operating in other medieval romances that feature friends who are not brothers (Langer 233–34). A version of the common doppelgänger motif but "without anxiety," this doubling allows for heroic feats and "functions as a literalization of the equality that moral philosophy requires of friends" (235).

Wary of the worldliness of this model of male affiliation, the church advanced an ideal of knighthood that embraced the virtues of "chastity, austerity, humility, and righteousness" (Richards 97). Poems and legends about King Arthur, the

Knights Templar, and the quest for the Holy Grail exemplify this tradition. Lastly, a school of courtly love emerged to moderate the martial temper of knightly chivalry, whose object was winning the love of a noble, usually unattainable lady. Embodied in the romance genre and shaping prevailing Western traditions of romantic love, this heterosexual version of chaste chivalry co-existed alongside a homosocial ideal of male friendship.

At the end of the Middle Ages, writers attempted to meld these three traditions into a vision of perfect knighthood, which returns in the romantic revival of the nineteenth century, for example, in the novels of Sir Walter Scott and the poetry of Alfred Tennyson, influential touchstones of Victorian masculinity.[18] Cultural ideals of a spiritual love between men persist, according to Jeffrey Richards, because they are products of "an exclusively or largely male-dominated and male-centered society" (98).

The extensive Renaissance discourse on friendship that emerged from medieval chivalry and Christian monastic traditions revives and expands classical formulations. Erasmus, who brought classical learning to Europe, begins his collection of over four thousand adages with the maxim "Amicorum communia omnia" (Between friends all is common), remarking that "[s]ince there is nothing more wholesome or more generally accepted than this proverb, it seemed good to place it as a favorable omen at the head of this collection of adages" (*Adages* 29). His second entry is the familiar formula "Amicitia aequalitas. Amicus alter ipse" (Friendship is equality. A friend is another self) (29–50), which he ascribes to Pythagoras, equates with the Hebrew "law" commanding "us to love our neighbor as ourselves," and observes that Aristotle quotes it as "proverbial in his [*Nicomachean*] *Ethics*, book 9" (31). This classical formulation, as Laurie Shannon finds, was widely disseminated in early modern English culture and especially among the middle and upper classes through the pervasive use of Cicero's *De amicitia* as a "gateway text in Latin learning" both for its style and exemplary humanist morality (*Sovereign Amity* 27–28). Young boys studying a classical curriculum in the Tudor era would have been initiated into Latin grammar and friendship doctrine almost simultaneously.

These pedagogical and "interpellating structures" locate a rhetoric of likeness at the very core of Renaissance self-fashioning that reflects the dominant sixteenth-century episteme Michel Foucault describes as "resemblance" and Shannon translates into the affective social structures of "homonormativity" (*Order of Things* 17; *Sovereign Amity* 22, 19). For Renaissance thinkers, heterosexual love and marriage constituted something of "an intellectual problem: the mixing of disparate kinds" —here, genders—which they believed had a diluting effect on identity (Shannon,

*Sovereign Amity* 64). Writers often portrayed erotic love as an invasive, infecting, and disintegrative force and considered marriage a set of legal constraints that yoked spouses in unequal, unfulfilling, and, according to John Milton, "unmanly" relations (Shannon, *Sovereign Amity* 65–67; Luxon 128–29).

By contrast, homosocial friendship was thought to encourage tempered self-sufficiency, which Shannon punningly calls "sovereignty," and strengthen gender identity among elite men who then voluntarily consented to "bind," "knit," and "knot" themselves to another equally sovereign self in the "practice" of amity.[19] Their earliest schooling exposed young men of the educated classes to classical friendship doctrine in which they recognized its "laws" about virtue, honor, and mutuality as codes they could use to fashion and judge selves.[20] The law governing changing commercial relations in this period contributed to this trend. A legal contract required some kind of parity or similarity between its parties to ensure their competence to enter and understand the contract and their mutual consent to its terms. The parties would then seal the contract, agreement, or treaty with a "good faith" handshake.

This gesture originated in the early worship of Mithras, a Persian god whose name derives from the Indo-European root *mihr*, which means both "friend" and "contract" (D. Cooper 2–3). Believed to represent a system of ethics that encouraged brotherhood, Mithras became the patron of soldiers who developed the handshake as a token of friendship to indicate that one was unarmed. When Mithras later entered the Roman pantheon as a guardian of contracts, oaths, and pledges, Roman soldiers spread the handshake gesture throughout the Mediterranean and Europe (Vermaseren 96–97). Two emblems from George Wither's collection, published in London in 1635, illustrate the association of the handclasp and the two major and competing forms of social affiliation. The emblem for *Bona fide* (good faith) shows hands clasped around a flaming and crowned heart as an image for friendship conceived as the willing connection of two loving and sovereign selves (figure 3; Shannon, *Sovereign Amity* 38–39). But Wither also includes a strikingly similar image for the binding union of heterosexual marriage, suggesting the closeness of these forms of affiliation for early modern readers. Emblem 37, *Jusque a la mort* (until death), depicts hands emerging from clouds on either side, as in *Bona fide*, clasped over a flaming heart and topped by a death's head (figure 4). In this emblem, however, the hands are clearly gendered by the different cuffs, one plain and one ruffled (99).

Shannon argues for a generous reading of the central friendship trope of similarity. We should understand it not in the condemnatory terms of contemporary philosophical critiques of identity and sameness, where the equality of some

Figure 3. *Bona fide*. From George Wither, *A Collection of Emblemes, Ancient and Modern* (London: A. Mathewes, 1635), 237; courtesy of Dartmouth College Library.

requires the subordination of others. Rather, we should try to grasp the opportunities such rhetoric afforded early modern subjects: to imagine a secular, preliberal, private, and "sovereign" self, whose freely consenting relations with a similar, self-determining other forms a "micropolity" of affiliation without subordination that prefigures democratic relations (*Sovereign Amity* 21).

While Renaissance similitude links friendship with consensual, contractual, and democratic practices, it also emphasizes the literal aspects of likeness as "a wonder-generating physical fact" (Shannon, *Sovereign Amity* 43). This "fact," by encouraging interchangeability, inhibits differences. To expand on the example I




Figure 4. *Jusque a la mort*. From George Wither, *A Collection of Emblemes, Ancient and Modern* (London: A. Mathewes, 1635), 99; courtesy of Dartmouth College Library.

mentioned earlier, when Thomas Elyot enumerates the qualities of mind and body requisite for gentlemen of the ruling class in the first educational treatise published in England in 1531, he places at its center what he calls "[t]he true discription of amitie or frendship" (161). Elyot cites Cicero's definition, which he paraphrases as "a parfecte consent of all thinges appertayninge as well to god as to man, with beneuolence and charitie" (162). But he augments it with his own expanded understanding that more nearly echoes Aristotelian notions: "frendshippe" is "a blessed and stable connexion of sondrie willes, makinge of two persones one in hauinge and suffringe . . . properly named of Philosophers the other I" (164).

Elyot then caps the familiar stories of "Horestes and Pilades" and "Piteas and Damon" with a detailed retelling of the exemplary tale of Titus and Gysippus. Brought together as boys, their "wonderful" physical likeness "in yeres, but also in stature, proporcion of body, fauour, and colur of visage, countenaunce & speche," not only prevents their "proper parentes" from discerning one from the other but *precedes* their acquaintance and *prepares* them for "such a mutuall affection, that their willes and appetites daily more and more so confederated them selfs" into indistinguishable, interchangeable doubles (166–67). Unlike twins, who passively bear a "natural" but incidental likeness, friends actively choose to fuse and, in Montaigne's words, "confuse" their wills, uniting parts of a whole that nature has perversely produced as separate parts. Elyot describes this process in political terms, as an intersubjective "confederation," a mutual alliance of equalized parts that is the initial structural embodiment of the United States.

The "consent," "confusion," "co(n)founding" of selves enacted in friendship, though distinguished from twinship by active choice, in later eras retain a strong, androcentric sense of kinship and interchangeability. By the eighteenth century, "fraternity," friendship's specifically gendered (though universally applied) term, famously constituted the end of the democratic process in which "liberty" and "equality" were the means (W. McWilliams 5). In the late nineteenth century, Walt Whitman adopts the early modern period's homonormative logic in "Democratic Vistas," when he anchors his radical understanding of mass governance in the "threads of manly friendship, fond and loving, pure and sweet, strong and life-long": "It is to the development, identification, and general prevalence of that fervid comradeship, (the adhesive love, at least rivaling the amative love hitherto possessing imaginative literature, if not going beyond it,) that I look for the counterbalance and offset of our materialistic and vulgar American democracy, and for the spiritualization thereof." In unabashedly passionate language, Whitman dreams of a spiritualizing "comradeship" that will rescue imaginative literature from its current unhealthy obsession with "amative love," "not only giving tone to individual character, and making it unprecedently emotional, muscular, heroic, and refined, but having the deepest relations to general politics." Finally, the "adhesiveness" that binds men to each other becomes itself interchangeable with, and the exclusively male generative source of, democracy: "I say democracy infers such loving comradeship, as its most inevitable twin or counterpart, without which it will be incomplete, in vain, and incapable of perpetuating itself" (2:414–15).[21]

## Tribal (Br)Otherhood and Sympathy/Sentiment

Renaissance friendship discourses represent the flowering of an earlier, exclusive form of social affiliation Benjamin Nelson calls "tribal brotherhood" as well as the beginning of its eventual demise through universalization. Widening theological interpretations of the Deuteronomic law (23:19–20), which forbade the ancient Hebrews from charging interest on loans to their "brothers" but allowed it for "strangers," offer a model of egalitarian "fraternalism" adopted by kin groups in early European society. This type of social organization is characterized by a tradition of the chivalric devotion of pairs of male friends, which, along with arranged marriages, were the mortar of clan and aristocratic alliances.

Nelson's remarkable argument reveals the imbrication of this tradition of male friendship with socioeconomics. The ancient friendship doctrine that celebrates the interchangeability of Orestes and Pylades or Damon and Phintias translates into the tradition of "substitutes" in settling debts of honor through dueling as well as in the practice of men standing surety for one another in business transactions, as Antonio does for Bassanio in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*. In the early modern period, standing surety came under sharp attack, for different reasons, by Protestant reformers like Martin Luther and John Calvin and by representatives of the emerging merchant classes like Sir Walter Raleigh. These critiques were part of a larger shift Nelson discerns from the exclusive fraternalism of "tribal brotherhood" through a medieval Christian program of "universal brotherhood" based in the "Golden Rule" to a precapitalist notion of "universal otherhood," which stressed the rational and commercial pursuit of individual gain. The decentering of inherited status and consequent "expansion" of the moral community results, as Alexis de Tocqueville also perceived about the effects of "democracy in America," in a thinning of the moral bond because, as Nelson concludes, "all men have been becoming brothers by becoming equally others" (136).[22]

Taking his cue from Max Weber, Nelson blames the rise of "otherhood" on the dependence of emerging capitalist systems on stable and consistent social "rules" (xxiv). By the eighteenth century, features of classical friendship modified by the Christian notion of universal charity infused international law and became the standard language of treaties and negotiations (155). This was part of a quickly spreading "spirit of benevolence" promulgated by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers whose views on friendship, according to sociologist Alan Silver, diverged considerably from Nelson's picture of "universal otherhood." David Hume, a leading light among Scottish thinkers, for example, distinguishes between two

forms of commerce: "interested" exchanges in which persons stood to gain or lose economically, and "disinterested" relations of sympathy and affection in which affiliation is its own reward (Silver 1480). Until the eighteenth century, both of these meanings co-existed in the definition of friendship, which could signify the relationship with a patron or sponsor, close or distant kin, or associates and advisors, as well as ties of warm affection (1487).

By midcentury, however, Dr. Johnson defines "friend" in personal and private —that is, modern—terms, as someone "with whom to compare minds and cherish private virtues" (Stone 79). According to thinkers like Hume and Adam Smith, it is the advent of commercial—that is, precapitalist—society that allows for the shift by confining economic relations of exchange to the market, thereby encouraging the flourishing of an independent moral realm, which frees "disinterested" friendships from the world of clan, patronage, obligation, or necessity. The Scots considered such "liberated" friendships to be morally superior to the honor-bound affiliation of "tribal brotherhood" because they are voluntary and inclusive, based on a "natural sympathy" that, according to Smith, "need not be confined to a single person but may safely embrace all the wise and virtuous, with whom we have been long and intimately acquainted" (224–25; Silver 1481).[23]

Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) is a work that, according to Julie Ellison, "confirms the affective ideals of republican discourse" (*Cato's Tears* 10). On its very first page, Smith lays out the problem: despite charges of selfishness, "man" harbors "principles" of sociability, later identified as the need for recognition, consolation, and approbation, "which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it" (9). Smith establishes the importance—in fact, the dominance—of visuality and spectacle from the outset. However, he continues, "we have no immediate experience of what other men feel . . . but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation" (9). Thus, "the imagination" plays a crucial role in allowing us to "place ourselves in his situation . . . enter as it were into his body and become in some measure the same person with him" (9)—that is, we imaginatively experience a bodily likeness with another person that amounts to interchangeability based on a fantasy of affect. Despite this radical process of identification—"changing places in fancy with the sufferer"— we remain anchored in our separate selves, since "it is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy" (9). This difference produces the mediating and tempering effects of sympathy.

Smith continues to elaborate this complicated scenario of interdependent fantasies. As we try, but fail, to fully imagine the emotions of an other, even an

intimate, "he" tries to imagine what we think "he" must be feeling and so "is constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation" (22). In Smith's theory, the installation of internal distance and difference, of the "impartial spectator" or social conscience within consciousness, helps to moderate passions and encourage social "concord" but also constitutes experience as performance and makes it vulnerable to panoptic surveillance; we are always watching ourselves or imagining ourselves being watched.[24] Rather than objectifying the self, however, according to Smith this impartiality encourages us to see ourselves as others would—to become, in the language of amity, our own friend and moderating, corrective force. Furthermore, as a spectator of what Smith calls the "benevolent affections" in life or in art, we imaginatively enter into the feelings of the friend as well as of the persons who are the object of friendship and so experience a "redoubled" dose of sympathy (38).[25] Thus, reading about friendship, and sharing the experience of reading about friendship, constitutes a crucial element in the broad, cohesion-producing operations of sympathetic exchange.

## Race and Friendship

This sympathizing sensibility, according to Ellison, found ready and powerful expression in dramatic spectacles and poetic accounts produced during the long eighteenth century in Britain. In particular, she argues that writers dramatized "cross-racial imperial relationships" in which characters from different cultures—most frequently European and Amerindian or African—struggle with inequality and "the legitimating rhetoric that evokes friendship between peers" (*Cato's Tears* 98). There is evidence, however, that from the very beginning of Europe's contact with the Americas, writers deployed various discourses of conquest grounded in classical notions of friendship and in what I call its obverse, a theory of natural slavery.

Tzvetan Todorov, for example, lays out the contradictory views entertained by Christopher Columbus of the native peoples he encountered on his voyages to the Caribbean, ideas shared by many people in Europe. The Indians were either "noble savages," gentle, innocent, and eager for conversion to Christianity, or "dirty dogs," lazy, ferocious, and fit only for enslavement. Both views, Todorov argues, "rest on a common basis, which is the failure to recognize the Indians, and the refusal to admit them as a subject having the same rights as oneself, but different" (49). We have seen that the early modern European mind, schooled in classical ideas of friendship, considered the equality of subjects synonymous with

a notion of identification or mirroring that depends on a similarity bordering on sameness. According to Todorov, the perennial problems of equality, sameness, and difference also inform our own postmodern dilemma: "[W]e want equality without its compelling us to accept identity; but also difference without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority. We aspire to reap the benefits of the egalitarian model [democratic individualism] and of the hierarchic model [monarchic collectivity]; we aspire to rediscover the meaning of the social without losing the quality of the individual" (249). Thus, we study the history of cross-racial encounters in the New World in order to ask how we can find a "new way to experience alterity" that affirms the other's exteriority and recognizes the other as a subject in his or her own right (250).

A key moment in this history is the famous debate that took place in Valladolid, Spain, in 1550 over the question of "just war" and the morality of using force in the conversion of native peoples to Christianity. Ginés de Sepúlveda, the preeminent Aristotelian scholar of his time, drew his arguments from Aristotle's *Politics*, which he had translated into Latin. In book 1, chapter 5, of *Politics*, Aristotle explains that the theory of natural slavery originates "in the constitution of the universe," specifically that "the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient." What follows from this is a "natural" principle of male superiority and dominance: "[T]he male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled." The same gendered hierarchy extends to "the lower sort . . . those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better. . . . For he who can be, and therefore is, another's, and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature" (1254b, 1132). Thus, natural slaves recognize and accept without question their need to be ruled and even welcome domination by those superior to them in reason.

This remarkable definition justified the Spaniards' use of the *Requerimiento*, an extraordinary document composed by the royal jurist Juan López Palacios Rubios around 1512.[26] Conquistadors were instructed to read the *Requerimiento* to the indigenous people they encountered, translated into their language and in the presence of a notary. Its promissory words, "we shall receive you in all love and charity" (Gibson 60), echo the friendship tropes of Christian fellowship. A swift acceptance of the document's terms won native auditors protection as vassals of the Spanish crown, while their "malicious" hesitation justified attack, enslavement, and murder.

Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca describes a scene at the end of his nine-year

sojourn in the south and southwest of North America in which Melchior Diaz, the *alcalde mayor* or chief justice and civil official of the province of Culiacán, administers the *Requerimiento* through an interpreter to the assembled Indians. Diaz promises them "that the Christians [the conquistadors] would take them as brothers and treat them very well, and we would order them [the conquistadors] not to provoke them or take them out of their lands, but rather to be their great friends, but that if they did not want to do this, the Christians would treat them very badly and carry them off as slaves to other lands" (166). The Indians' immediate acceptance "occurred in the presence of the notary they had there and many other witnesses" (167). Supporters of Indian rights, like Bartolomé de Las Casas, discussed below, resolutely condemned the *Requerimiento* as a complete sham. However, its form and the stipulations of its performance (translated into the native tongue, witnessed and notarized like a contract) suggest that colonial policy-makers believed the Amerindians just rational enough to apprehend and accept the "natural" superiority of the Spanish crown and church in accordance with the Aristotelian definition of natural slavery.

Adopting Aristotelian principles, Sepúlveda declared political hierarchy to be the "natural" structure of human society and, using Aristotelian terms, declared Spanish rule over the Amerindians to be "the domination of perfection over imperfection, of force over weakness, of eminent virtue over vice" (*Democrates Alter* 20; qtd. in Todorov 152). Although Sepúlveda conceded that Aztec culture, the most advanced in Meso-America, contained what appeared to be "proofs" of civilization—public institutions such as extensive cities, appointed rulers, and commercial transactions—without having visited the New World he nevertheless concludes: "In wisdom, skill, virtue and humanity, these people are as inferior to the Spaniards as children are to adults and women to men; there is as great a difference between them as there is between savagery and forbearance, between violence and moderation, almost—I am inclined to say—as between monkeys and men" (*Democrates Alter* 33; qtd. in Todorov 153). According to this logic, Indians were the ontologically inferior term in a string of analogies that defined Indian men as infantile, feminized, savage, violent, and beastly. Thus, they were ineligible for natural or civil rights or friendship with European men; Indian women were doubly burdened and doubly ineligible. All deserved, even required, conquest and the imposition of the religion of "peace" and the "true faith."

The Dominican monk Las Casas, who first traveled to America in 1502 as a missionary and became one of the staunchest defenders of Indian rights, made the opposing case at Valladolid. In his five days of testimony, he rejected pagan philosophy and boldly asserted, "Aristotle, farewell! From Christ, the eternal

truth, we have the commandment 'You must love your neighbor as yourself'" (*Apologia* 3; qtd. in Todorov 160). Under the Christian banner of the *potential* equality of all people through their acceptance of faith, Las Casas attacked Sepúlveda's assertion of inherent good and evil, superiority and inferiority. Indians, he argued, have the same "natural" rights as Europeans. Thus, he fiercely condemned the use of the *Requerimiento*, writing to Prince Philip in 1544, "All the Indians to be found here are to be held as free: for in truth so they are, by the same right as I myself am free" (qtd. in Todorov 162).

But this equality, as Todorov observes, is achieved only through the potentially renovating operation of Christian faith. In his condemnation of Aristotle, Las Casas failed to recognize that the biblical injunction to neighborly love he invoked echoed Aristotle's pagan definition of spiritual friendship. The ontological "non-difference" he advanced already assumed what Todorov calls "a kind of cultural identity." While Sepúlveda's "prejudice of superiority" made knowledge of the other impossible and large-scale genocide acceptable, Todorov finds Las Casas's "prejudice of equality" a "greater obstacle" to knowledge of the other, one that is perhaps "more attractive" but remains indisputably "colonialist" (165–167, 173).

Although the indefatigable Las Casas eventually discovers what Todorov calls "perspectivism," a "higher form of egalitarianism" (192), a rhetoric of instrumental friendship enters Spanish colonialist discourse under the good friar's unwitting sponsorship. In 1573, Juan de Ovando, the head of Spain's Council of the Indies, drew up its definitive royal ordinances in the light of the Valladolid controversy, recommending linguistic and amicable pretense in the service of "pacification":

> Discoveries are not to be called conquests. Since we wish them to be carried out peacefully and charitably, we do not want the use of the term "conquest" to offer any excuse for the employment of force or the causing of injury to the Indians. . . . [Erstwhile conquistadors] are to gather information about the various tribes, languages and divisions of the Indians in the province and about the lords whom they obey. They are to seek friendship with them through trade and barter, showing them great love and tenderness and giving them objects to which they will take a liking. Without displaying any greed for the possessions of the Indians, they are to establish friendship and cooperation with the lords and nobles who seem most likely to be of assistance in the pacification of the land. . . . The preachers should ask for their children under the pretext of teaching them and keep them as hostages; they should also persuade them to build churches where they can teach so that they may be safer. By these and other means are the Indians to be pacified and indoctrinated, but in no way are

they to be harmed, for all we seek is their welfare and their conversion. (qtd. in Todorov 173–74)

The rhetoric of peace, friendship, and Christian charity cynically advanced by Ovando encourages learning the natives' culture in order to eradicate it and stealing their children and thus their future—"benefits" that serve imperial designs as well as if not better than warfare and genocide.

Early modern French writing on New World encounters explicitly links colonialist discourses of friendship with Eurocentric insistence on Indian alterity and the consumerism of incipient capitalism (Bartolovich 207). Theorists call the structure of modern Western subjectivity emerging from these encounters "cultural cannibalism . . . the unethical reduction of the other to the status of 'me' or 'mine'" (Deutscher 162). The touchstone text in this tradition is Montaigne's "Des cannibales" (Of Cannibals, 1580). This French skeptic and intellectual was profoundly shaken by reports of the New World such as *Histoire d'un voyage faict en la terre du Bresil, autrement dite Amerique* (1578), penned by his countryman Jen de Léry, a Protestant who traveled to Brazil with the explorer Villegagnon. Léry's account records the shock he experienced witnessing the ritual cannibalism practiced by the Tupinamba Indians as well as the cannibalism of Europeans under duress in the New World. His account served as a source for Montaigne's essay, which holds up the American cannibal as a mirror for Europe and finds—a European cannibal. That is, by comparison with the idealized innocence and simplicity of the Tupinamba, the supposedly civilized culture of France appeared rife with violence, dogmatism, and unreflecting ethnocentrism. The fiercely defended Catholic doctrine of the "real presence" of God's body in the Eucharist and French Catholic persecution and genocide of the Huguenots lent weight to the charge.

For historiographer Michel de Certeau, Montaigne's account of the cannibalistic Tupinamba serves as "an allegory of the relation to the other in all its forms" (Freccero, "Toward" 365).[27] Certeau argues that while the European intellectual attempts to capture the exotic other in writing, a principal instrument of colonial mastery and of the production of knowledge, the Tupinamba described by Montaigne condemns French social inequities and corruption in speech that is "groundbreaking and organizing, pathfinding in its own space, it precedes us, moving, passing on. It is always ahead of us, and always escapes us" (*Heterologies* 78). This mobile "cannibalistic orality" serves the Western intellectual as a kind of Indian guide through the discursive wilderness and new epistemic territory opened up by cross-cultural contact. But in this guiding role, the other, with his

powerful, threatening speech, faces exoticization and incorporation (cultural cannibalism) by the West (77). The problem for Montaigne and for European modernity is to innovate a noncannibalistic "ethic of writing" that recognizes the other's role in the constitution of his subjectivity while simultaneously acknowledging his separate and indigestible existence (78–79). This acknowledgment, for Certeau, grounds a modern metaphysics because, as he explains, "God and the cannibal, equally elusive," both occupy a space of radical alterity that precedes and authorizes but finally eludes "the modern European masculine subject of humanism" (69; Freccero, "Toward" 370).

The new ethic Certeau glimpses in Montaigne's writing of the other/Other turns on figures of mirroring and incorporation. Thus, we should not be surprised to find the lost friend also inhabiting this metaphorical space. In "De l'amitié," a key text in the friendship archive discussed earlier in this chapter, Montaigne pens a Ciceronian paean to his perfect friendship with the deceased writer La Boétie. Linking this essay with "Des cannibales," Certeau collapses the two figures of the other: "The cannibal (who speaks) and La Boétie (who listens) are metaphors for each other. One is near, one is far, both are absent, both are other. . . . The text is produced in relation to this missed present, this speaking, hearing other" (79).

By conflating the figure of the cannibal/God and the perfect friend as absent presences, Certeau links the incorporative thematics of cannibalism with a Ciceronian discourse of specifically male friendship as well as with Christian and chivalric discourses of sacrificial divinity and heroism. The famous "merging" that Montaigne extols between himself and his friend, as Carla Freccero demonstrates, relies on metaphors of "nourishment, hunger, tasting, communion" and replicates the incorporation of the loved and lost object in Sigmund Freud's description of mourning ("Cannibalism" 78). In this psychic process, the ego figuratively incorporates the lost or absent other in order to preserve (contain) or absorb (identify with) it. But the ego also resents and then denies the interior existence of the other. The inability to successfully mourn and let the other go produces what Freud calls "melancholia," a state of incomplete mourning in which a desired but lost and then denied love object returns as a ghostly trace within the self.[28]

Recent discussions of the ethics of alterity draw heavily on Freud's concept of mourning and melancholy and on the various meanings constellated around cannibalism. I mention a few of these here because the psychic structures of mourning and melancholy illuminate the dynamics of identification and projection within friendship discussed in the following chapters. Judith Butler, for

example, argues that the affective foreclosures that result from having to choose between identifying with or desiring the other constitute all gendered subjectivity (*Bodies That Matter* 235–36). Anne Anlin Cheng links the disavowed identificatory structure of melancholy with the history of toxic American race relations (11). An "anticannibal ethics" has been drawn from Luce Irigaray's considerations of friendship and love in *I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History* and *Etre Deux* (Deutscher 159).

Derrida offers an extensive examination of friendship and mourning, expanding the Freudian scenario in order to "generate a generalized concept of the cannibal or 'eating' subject" that transforms relational ethics into an ethics of successfully failed cannibalism (Deutscher 170). In an interview entitled " 'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject," Derrida argues that the "so called nonanthropophagic cultures construct their most elevated socius, indeed the sublimity of their morality, their politics, and their right," upon "the idealizing interiorization of the phallus" and its various signifiers, such as words, things, bread and wine, or "the breast of the other" (113–14). The resulting "carnophallogocentrism" characterizes all subjects as "mourning subjects" noncoincident with themselves because they contain and are constituted by the other as ideal, memory, or love object (*Mémoires* 28). But even in the melancholy identification of friendship, our cannibalism always fails because, try as we might, we can never wholly assimilate or efface the other in us. "And inversely," Derrida concludes about the loss of his friend Paul de Man, "the failure succeeds; an aborted interiorization is at the same time a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over there in his death, outside of us" (35).[29]

Getting a relatively late start in the business of colonization, the Protestant English fashioned their endeavors as antithetical to the "Black legend" of Spanish atrocities and the assimilationist strategies of the Catholic French. Nevertheless, their agenda also drew heavily on gendered discourses of friendship as exemplified with particular clarity in Roger Williams's Algonquian/English dictionary boldly entitled *A Key into the Language of America*. The very first entry in the first chapter, "Of Salutation," is the word "Netompaûog," Algonquian for "Friends" (93). Williams introduces this initial word with an offhand assertion of his belief in the "natural" (pre-Christianized) similarity of Indians and English: "The Natives are of two sorts, (as the English are)." However, he signals his skepticism of the English belief in native equality when he observes that "What cheare Nétop" is how settlers address natives they encounter "out of a desire to Civilize them" (93).

By contrast, the very structure of Williams's *Key*, with its two vertical columns of facing Algonquian and English words, suggests the face-to-face, dialogic interaction of friendship and its presumption or production of parity.[30]

Still, the relationship Williams describes in this first chapter is not the long-term intimacy recommended by the ancients as the basis for perfect friendship but an amicable predisposition that initiates dialogic recognition between ontological—and implicitly masculine—equals. These are relationships of utility and necessity—lesser forms of friendship in Aristotle's terms—that involve trade, exchange of goods and knowledge, aid in travel, and help in survival and crises. Some of these phrases ring with an autobiographical urgency. Exiled in 1635 from the Massachusetts Bay by his intolerant Puritan countrymen, Williams took wintry flight to Narragansett Bay. One can imagine him uttering several phrases in this chapter to the natives he met there who sheltered him: "I pray your favour . . . I came over the water" (94).

The moral lesson of this opening chapter provides Williams with the occasion to hold up, as Montaigne did, the savage mirror to so-called civilization. In this instance, it is the "courtesy" of the "Pagans" who, without the benefits of Christian conversion or European education, evinced a kindness and tolerance of differences that "condemns" by comparison the barbarities of "Uncourteous Englishmen," as Williams pointedly observes in the short didactic poem that concludes this first chapter. In testimony given in 1682, the year before he died, Williams was very clear about his affiliations. He recounted that "when the hearts of my countrymen and friends and brethren failed me, [God's] infinite wisdom and merits stirred up the barbarous heart of Canonicus to love me as his son to his last gasp." This providential affection ensured Williams the friendship of the Narragansett chief's nephew, the great sachem Miantonomo, and many other lesser sachems in the region (*Complete Writings* 6:407–8). The untutored "courtesy" of these "natural men" linked them to long-standing English discourses on honor and heroism running through texts like Chaucer's *The Knight's Tale* and Spenser's *The Faerie Queen*, in which the nobility of friendship plays a major role.[31]

Evidence that native peoples entertained their own ideas of friendship and could see through European professions of amity appears throughout early accounts. John Smith, the pugnacious captain of the Jamestown settlement who treated Indians cavalierly, reports being addressed in 1609 by a young Powhatan brave named Okaning who charged: "We perceive and well know that you intend to destroy us, that are here to intreat and desire your friendship" (2:210). Often, interracial marriages, like the one in 1614 between English planter John Rolfe and

Chief Powhatan's daughter, Pocahontas, temporarily facilitated amicable economic relations between groups of men otherwise hostile to each other (Calloway 153). There is some evidence that Indian sachems viewed the "gift exchange" of women through intermarriage as an expression of friendship among men, which English settlers, on the whole, rejected.[32]

Although specific native discourses on friendship are difficult to document, one prominent example is the Covenant Chain, a complex and shifting confederation of trade and military alliances that extended from the eastern seaboard to the Great Lakes region and was active from the early seventeenth century to the late eighteenth century. Originating in the Great League of Peace, a compact established among the five nations of the Iroquois by Deganawidah and Hiawatha before the appearance of Europeans, the Covenant Chains bound other tribes and European trading partners in bonds of "friendship" that ensured the stability of commerce between imperial powers who were hungry for furs and natural resources and native tribes who had come to depend upon trade for survival.

The term "covenant" may have come from the Protestant Dutch who first traded with the Iroquois. Since they did not have "chains" before contact, the Iroquois invented a word for this concept that, according to Cayuga chief Jacob E. Thomas, meant literally "arms linked together" (Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* 123). Through recurring performances of intercultural ritual dramas known as Condolence Councils, tribal representatives and colonial officials "polished" the chain, strengthened the links, or created new ones and renewed the covenant with "frequent meetings well-oiled with food and presents and laced with rum" (Jennings, *History* 22).[33]

The earliest recorded description of a Condolence Council, "The Mohawk Treaty with New France at Three Rivers, 1645," published in the *Jesuit Relations*, contains language and gestures of friendship that reappear in other reports of treaty negotiations as late as 1776 (Jennings, *History* 135). At the parley at Three Rivers, Kiotseaeton, the leading Mohawk spokesman, came arrayed completely in wampum (belts or "collars" of strung beads that were a means of exchange as well as a record of events) and rose dramatically from his approaching shallop to address the French and their Huron allies. Hailing them as "brothers," he later observed in the council meeting, "The minds and thoughts of men are too diverse to fall into accord; it is [he who is in] the Sky that will combine all" (qtd. in Jennings, *History* 137–38). During the ensuing ritual, this consummate performer employed eloquence and wit in the bestowal of seventeen "presents" of wampum, each accompanied by a dramatic reenactment of events significant to the participating parties. The tenth gift involved a binding ceremony, probably the

Adonwa or Personal Chant of adoption, one of the four most sacred of the ancient, pre-Columbian rites (Jennings, *History* 129). Father Barthelemy Vimont, the Jesuit missionary present at the parley who took copious notes, relates:

> He took hold of a Frenchman, placed his arm within his, and with his other arm he clasped that of an Algonquin. Having thus joined himself to them, "Here," he said, "is the knot that binds us inseparably; nothing can part us." This collar [of wampum] was extraordinarily beautiful. "Even if the lightning were to fall upon us, it could not separate us; for, if it cuts off the arm that holds you to us, we will at once seize each other by the arm." And thereupon he turned around, and caught the Frenchman and the Algonquin by their two other arms,—holding them so closely that he seemed unwilling ever to leave them. (qtd. in Jennings, *History* 141)

In his analysis of circum-Atlantic performance, Joseph Roach calls this gesture "the kinesthetic foundation of what was to become the concept of the Covenant Chain" (137–38).

Forged in "yron" between the Iroquois and the Dutch in the early seventeenth century and later between the Iroquois and French, after 1664 the chain was "reforged" by the English in "Pure Silver" according to Mohawk chief sachem Tahaiadoris, speaking on September 23, 1689 (Fenton 314). Addressing Governor Fletcher at Albany in 1694, the Indian spokesman Sadeganaktie explained the import of this imagery: "The least Member cannot be touched, but the whole Body must feel and be sensible; if therefore an Enemy hurt the least part of the Covenant Chain, we will join to destroy that Enemy, for we are one Head, one Flesh, and one Blood" (qtd. in Jennings, *History* 22). Sir William Johnson echoed these powerful sentiments in his negotiations with the Six Nations on April 25, 1748, recalling how their "Forefathers . . . made an offer to the Governour [of Albany] to enter into a Band of Friendship with him and his People which he was so pleased at that he told you he would find a strong Silver Chain which would never break, slip, or Rust to bind you and him forever in Brothership together, and that your Warriours and ours should be as one Heart, One Head, one Blood &c." (qtd. in Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* 145). This savvy royal agent, intent on consolidating the English crown's influence with the Iroquois during the Revolutionary period, repeats the near formulaic combination consisting of the assimilationist rhetoric of the French ("one Blood") with the spiritual figure of the Iroquois ("one Head") and the conventional early modern European image of friendship ("one Heart").

This "polishing" of the chain represented a new structure of association, which

joined but did not merge the English and Iroquois, as the latter hoped, and in which "[d]iplomacy had replaced domesticity and kinship" (Dennis 269). In fact, some historians argue, as Johnson's words certainly intimate, that English treaty scribes may have unilaterally imposed the comparatively impersonal silver chain metaphor on native speakers, overriding the more traditional Iroquoian figure of clasped hands for any recognized alliance of friendship (Haan 45). As we will see in the following chapters, in the hands of white writers the figure of the chain connotes fixed and hierarchical *vertical* ranking, as in John Winthrop's invocation of the classical concept of "the Great Chain of Being." In Hannah Foster's novel, chains represent marital enthrallment, parental coercion, and chattel slavery. Steeped in the contemporary accounts of native traditions recorded by missionary and ethnographer John Heckewelder, James Fenimore Cooper prefers the hand-clasp as the performative gesture of friendship in his frontier romances, while Catharine Sedgwick attributes to her Pequot heroine as well as to her English characters a discourse of "chains" that connotes the deeply spiritual and lateral attachment of perfect friendship.

Manipulated by all parties to support their specific interests, a cross-racial discourse of friendship was part of the representational language that evolved in "the middle ground" of "accommodation" between Europeans and Indians in the early years of North American settlement. Studying the language of treaty negotiations, historian Richard White finds that until the mid-1790s, Anglo-Americans and Indians of both the Western Confederacy and the Six Nations used the metaphor of "brothers" sprung from "a common Mother" (the land) resisting a common paternal tyrant (King George III). While this fictional fraternity implies relations of equality important in the Revolutionary rhetoric of the time, each group understood the term differently. For Indians, White argues, "brother" was the diplomatic kinship term "least fraught with mutual obligation. . . . Brothers did not necessarily share warm feelings. Brothers could be less than friends" (68–69). After the Revolution, when shifting to a discourse of conquest failed largely because it could not be squared with notions of republican values and universal natural rights, U.S. negotiators adopted the more flexible rhetoric of benign patriarchy, whose logic of younger sons displacing older ones, as the biblical Jacob displaced Esau, foreshadowed the "vanishing Indian" of the early nineteenth century (72, 75).[34]

"Race," as Ellison observes about the period's literature of sensibility, "becomes a figure for emotion" and makes empire "a setting for men in crisis" (*Cato's Tears* 17). The racially marked other—now also including Africans—who earlier stood for an inassimilable savagery or intellectual incapacity that required re-

moval, extermination, or paternalistic supervision becomes a nostalgic figure for the dangers *and* growing delights of heightened emotion produced by relationships across perceived gulfs of inequality and difference.

## Women and Friendship

During the colonial period, classicism filtered through Christianity met Enlightenment thought in the American landscape. The English-dominated, Puritan-inflected culture of North America promulgated a Christian humanism in which a classical education remained an essential feature of a gentleman's profile. Renaissance republican theorists revived Greek and Roman ideas about the importance of the rational and "cooperative virtues" like friendship and justice, which filtered into the American colonies (Bloch 43). Thomas Jefferson jotted several maxims about friendship into his *Literary Commonplace Book* during the 1760s; one from Euripides' *Phoenissae* seems particularly prophetic: "Prize equality that ever linketh friend to friend, city to city, allies to each other, for equality is man's natural law" (71). Although by the early nineteenth century, incipient romanticism drove writers to prefer Greek ideals of beauty and spirit, the mid-eighteenth century extolled Cicero—orator, senator, resister of imperial tyranny, and advocate of ideal friendship—as the model citizen (Winterer 25). According to Ellison's history of emotion, Adam Smith envisioned moral sentiment arising from the bonds between "elite males" who replay "the neoclassical scenario of the Roman Stoic surrounded by his sympathetic friends" (*Cato's Tears* 10).

This classical republicanism posited an exclusively masculine public sphere insulated from femininity, which thinkers associated with uncontrolled passion, attachment to luxury, and economic dependence and considered the makings of political corruption (Winterer 22). But Protestant religious influences continued to shape moral thinking in this period and repudiated the classical ethics of Aristotle and the Stoics, including their ideas on friendship, for their failure to examine broader social values like benevolence or to include a psychology of the passions in theories of virtue (Fiering 5).[35]

In the turbulent wake of the religious revivals that swept the eastern seaboard, the ideas of the Scottish philosophers about the centrality of sympathy in the formation of moral society became widely influential, building on Protestant religious psychology, expanding and attenuating the domain of the classical model of dyadic friendship. The earlier transformation by Augustine and Aquinas of Greek *philia* and Latin *amicitia* into Christian *caritas* opened the way for the inclusion of women and cross-gender "spiritual" friendships, clinched in the late

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the Scottish philosophers' emphasis on universal benevolence and sympathetic interchange. Women's friendships, particularly when expressed in conversation and letters, become the romantic era's cultural model for affective attachment and, as the nineteenth century progressed, were increasingly stigmatized as sentimental and "unmanly" (Ellison, *Delicate Subjects* 31–32).

The extensive conduct literature written during the early period, however, reveals not only that women as well as men were being instructed in current theories of amity but also the interesting amalgam those theories had become. An essay, "On Friendship," appearing in *The Lady's Magazine and Musical Repository* published in New York City in November 1801, illustrates how pedagogues at the turn of the nineteenth century adapted classically inflected versions of friendship to more contemporary theories of sympathy. Although this essay is not addressed specifically to women, its appearance in this popular periodical suggests its role in recommending a particular conception of homosocial friendship for "ladies."

The essay's first sentence alludes to a model of dyadic bonding inherited from the ancients but mostly shorn of their emphasis on rationality: "Friendship is an affectionate union of two persons, nearly of the same age, the same situation in life, the same dispositions and sentiments, and, as some writers will have it, of the same sex" (245). While this opens the door to cross-gender friendships, all the proffered examples—"of Achilles and Patroclus, in Homer; of Nysas and Eurylas, in Virgil; and of David and Jonathan in the Sacred Writings"—are men and warriors of epic, heroic, and ideal proportions.[36] In highlighting not only the strength of homosocial bonding but "to what a degree of enthusiasm this attachment is sometimes carried," the author emphasizes pair friendship's positive "force" as well as its potentially dangerous, blinding intensity, which can lead to abuses.

Indeed, the author complains that "some of the ancients go so far as to say, that we may be unjust to others for the sake of our friend."[37] This may be an allusion to the threat some people perceived women's friendship posed during this period to conventional, heteronormative morality. In 1778, for example, the dramatic elopement of Lady Eleanor Butler and Sarah Ponsonby, daughters of the Irish gentry, to a rural cottage in the Welsh vale of Llangollen, later dubbed "the Shrine to Friendship," called attention to women's "romantic friendship" as an alternative to marriage and potential social threat to male control of women (Taussig 72; Mavor 203).[38] The essay's proffered examples are striking in their insistently masculine character: Patroclus's death in battle taking Achilles' place and wearing

his fabled armor produces a passionate revenge and pervasive melancholy; Nysas, a Trojan in Aeneas's army, dies attempting to save his "boyish" friend, Eurylas, whose unequal status recalls erotic, pederastic models of male love (*Aeneid*, book 9; Konstan, *Friendship* 38); while Jonathan's heralded attachment was, in David's words, "wonderful, passing the love of women" (2 Samuel 1:26) and constituted the age's epitome of "manly love" (Richards 93). How were women to find a place in these models?

In explaining why "friendship should form so conspicuous a part" in human character, the author of this essay shifts registers, alluding to Enlightenment views of human nature. In particular, the author alludes to the Scottish philosophers' ideas of a common "principle of benevolence and generosity" separate from market interests that attaches people to particular others "without any expectation of benefit from them" (246). In this view, the universal need for sympathy among "persons of sentiment" encourages friendship, for in this relation one "finds his joys so much encreased, and his sorrows so much alleviated, when shared by a sincere friend" (246). The stress falls on fellow feeling, grounded in the eighteenth century's "logic of affective androgyny, encompassing the republican discourses of both manly virtue and benevolent motherhood" (Chapman and Hendler 3), rather than on the ancients' emphasis on the mutual growth of virtue in restraining the passions and sustaining the stability of the city-state. The author also puts particular emphasis on "sincerity" and the disruption caused by excessive emotion or false friends. Thus, the short essay concludes by warning young, probably female readers against the dangers of forming early, exclusive, and passionate connections with insincere people—a persistent anxiety in classical and Renaissance friendship literature that was amplified by political fears about demagoguery, false appearances, and seduction in the new U.S. Republic explored by authors like Charles Brockden Brown.

The focus then shifts back to classically inflected concerns with making informed—that is, reasoned—choices in matters of the affections. As the opening examples of dyadic friendship from the Greek, Latin, and biblical traditions suggest, these can disrupt the status quo by uncontrollable "enthusiasm." This possibility is so worrisome that the author admits dolefully: "The moderns [that is, Renaissance thinkers], indeed, though they seem to have abated of this enthusiasm, have not been able to extinguish it" (245–46). A means of controlling these passions was to feminize and privatize them.[39]

According to the emerging histories of affect, by the mid-nineteenth century women were inextricably associated with emotion in general, so that sympathetic attachment became a feminine and largely domestic domain (Chapman and

Hendler 3). Still, as Anne McClintock demonstrates, "the cult of domesticity was a crucial, if concealed, dimension of male as well as female identities . . . and an indispensable element both of the industrial market and the imperial enterprise" (5). I am arguing that, conversely, aspects of public political culture in the form of friendship narratives permeate the domestic sphere. As the essay from *The Lady's Magazine and Musical Repository* suggests and Addie Brown's letter with which I began the introduction confirms, a version of the classical model of aristocratic dyadic friendship reserved for men persists in female culture, co-existing with neoclassical notions of sympathy, thus giving women at least a foothold in debates about equality, virtue, citizenship, and national identity.

## Coda: Contemporary and Feminist Philosophies of Friendship

My research indicates that the role of women and differences of race, class, and sexuality became issues for philosophers of friendship only in the last quarter of the twentieth century, if at all.[40] For Derrida, "the double exclusion of the feminine"—the barring of friendships between females and friendships between males and females—from all the "great ethico-politico-philosophical discourses on friendship" is not only a crucial question for our time but leads to the chief concerns of "deconstruction." He identifies these as the discursive history of concepts and "history *tout court*" and the question of "phallogocentrism," a construction/constriction of meaning and monopolizing of power by the imposition of the phallus as center and authority (*Politics* 277–79).[41] Derrida adds that this double exclusion "even" raises the question "of sacrificial 'carno-phallogocentrism,' " the discursive dominance of an anthropophagic (symbolically cannibalistic) masculine Western subject discussed earlier in relation to Montaigne's melancholy alterity (*Politics* 307).

Derrida's complex musings and his fascinating deployment of Aristotle offer insights into the discursive nexus of gender and friendship and its political implications. Although the canonical discourses on friendship "from Plato to Montaigne, from Aristotle to Kant, from Cicero to Hegel" are not homogeneous, in Derrida's view they all "will have explicitly tied the friend-brother to virtue and to justice, to moral reason and political reason" (*Politics* 277). This canonical notion of friendship operates through "homology" and "reciprocity," structures of correspondence—like a common gender—and mutual exchange that produce symmetry between citizens. As we have seen, this "logic of the same" derives from the classical idea of "the true friend . . . his ideal double, his other self, the same self but improved" and for Derrida "would confer on friendship the essential and

essentially sublime figure of virile homosexuality," thus privileging "the figure of the brother" (as opposed to the father) (*Politics* 4, 279). Derrida labels the result "fratriarchy"—"a *familial*, *fraternalist* and thus *androcentric* configuration of politics" that has characterized all of the major political settlements in the West (*Politics* viii; his emphases). Phallogocentrism returns as "phratrocentrism" (*Politics* 278).

It is not hard to imagine Aristotle's notions of similitude and presence in friendship as the bogeyman in this postmodern critique, but Aristotelian thought and Aristotle as signifier play a complicated and framing role in Derrida's argument. Every chapter in his book *Politics of Friendship* is an extended meditation on Aristotle's apocryphal pronouncement cited in Montaigne's famous essay "De l'amitié," "O my friends, there is no friend" (140). Thus, Aristotle's ghostly words frame each major topic Derrida considers. In his critique of Derrida's study, Fred Dallmayr observes about this talismanic remark, "The aporetic character of this statement (its invocation of friends whose lack it simultaneously affirms) provides in many ways the keynote or tenor of the entire argument" (107).[42] Continually turning over this phrase, Derrida finally demonstrates how "the Graeco-Roman model" governed by homology and reciprocity "bears within itself, nevertheless, potentially, the power to become infinite and dissymmetrical" (*Politics* 290)—that is, to be widely, even infinitely extended and to encompass differences like the difference of gender.

While Aristotle provides us with the lofty "idea" of perfect friendship, Derrida observes that this ideal is "contradictory in its very essence" and makes the reality of a friend in the present impossible. Thus, Derrida argues, rephrasing Aristotle, "*in the name of friendship* we must conclude, alas, if there is friendship, 'there is no friend' " ("Politics" in *Journal* 636; his emphasis). In this view, friendship is thoroughly deconstructive, the ultimate deferral: "Friendship is never a given in the present; it belongs to the experience of waiting, of promise, or of commitment. Its discourse is that of prayer and at issue there is that which responsibility opens to the future" (636). Here, the bright thread of Aristotle's *philia* takes on the darkening shades of Cicero's *amicitia*, since throughout Derrida embraces the elegiac "Ciceronian logic" that defines friendship as the ultimate space of loss through mourning the deceased friend that his countryman Montaigne honed to a fine melancholy point. The ability to talk about the friend, Derrida insists, implies his absence, his death. The temporality of friendship, then, signified by Aristotle's repeated framing address to friends who cannot/do not exist, is a paradoxical "future anterior" that always surpasses the present (637).

At issue from a political perspective is a version of the problem feminist theo-

rists have identified as the "dilemma of difference" (Minow 21). If one argues for the inclusion of women on the basis of their theoretical equality with men, one reinscribes masculine norms and ignores differences, which, whether natural or socially constructed, characterize many women's realities. But arguing for and privileging sexual difference has often implied women's inferiority with respect to male norms and a harmful ignorance of racial/ethnic and class differences among women. Can we define "equality" not as sameness but as a parity or equity that rests fluidly or contingently on differences? Can we redefine the norms that determine inclusion and agency in society? Furthermore, how can we found a workable democracy on utopian promises of affiliation?[43]

To imagine such a friendship, Derrida draws on Friedrich Nietzsche's resignification of "good friendship" (a phrase that inverts Aristotle's notion of "the friendship of the good") as a bond that "supposes disproportion. It demands a certain rupture in reciprocity or equality, as well as the interruption of all fusion or confusion between you and me" that marks erotic relationships. This logic "calls friendship back to the irreducible precedence of the other," to "a sentiment even more sublime than the freedom or self-sufficiency of a subject"—that is, to "a friendship prior to friendships" that exists "in the being-together that any allocution supposes" (*Politics* 62–63; "Politics" in *Journal* 636). In this view, friendship constrains the ontological singularity of the self by its assumption and acceptance of the prior claims of the listening other.

Under the auspices of his contemporaries, philosophers like Maurice Blanchot, George Bataille, Jean Luc Nancy, and especially Emanuel Lévinas, Derrida argues for the emergence of "friends of an entirely different kind, inaccessible friends, friends who are alone because they are incomparable and without common measure, reciprocity or equality," friends who call on us "to share what cannot be shared: solitude" (*Politics* 35). Including "the double feminine" in a vision of democratic politics freed from "the homo-fraternal and phallogocentric schema," then, can occur only under the sign of radical "heterology, asymmetry, and infinity," which runs counter to the "homology," "symmetry," "immanence," "finitism, and politicist concord" of classical friendship (*Politics* 306; "Politics" in *Journal* 644). The "we" of human community is, therefore, always paradoxical, a "community of those without community" (*Politics* 63; see also 47n.15). Finally, however, Derrida cannot release but can only repeat and revise Aristotle. The last line of *Politics of Friendship* calls upon and thus constitutes this community of the bereft by playing on Aristotle's haunting apostrophe *minus* the second negating phrase, leaving it provocatively incomplete: "O my democratic friends . . ." (*Politics* 306).

Responses to this largely unsatisfying postmodern formulation of friendship often return to Aristotelian thought. In his critique of Derrida, Dallmayr argues not for the "wholesale retrieval" of the classical tradition but for the readmission of Aristotle's ideas about friendship and politics in particular. As the title of Ricoeur's study *Oneself as Another* implies, he explicitly reclaims aspects of Aristotelian friendship doctrine to counter the "irreducible precedence of the other," a notion Derrida borrows from Lévinas. Specifically, Aristotle's emphasis on activity (friends *doing* good things for each other) and mutuality (as opposed to the obligatory equivalence of reciprocity) enables Ricoeur to highlight ethics rather than morality—that is, goods and striving for a common good rather than individual rights and their protection and "solicitude" for others rather than duties and obligations (189). The editor of a 1994 collection of philosophical essays on friendship concludes that Aristotle is the thinker with whom most of the contributors wrestle and thus dubs him "the patron saint of this volume" (Rouner 10). One of the essays in this collection considers friendship across gender difference and sports a witty title that places director Rob Reiner's popular 1989 romantic comedy on the subject in direct confrontation with Aristotelian notions of friendship: "When Harry and Sally Met the *Nicomachean Ethics*."

Feminist philosophers, on the whole, have embraced a *revised* Aristotelian notion of friendship and community. Distinguished legal philosopher Linda Redlick Hirshman argues that his misogyny notwithstanding, "Aristotle's writings on virtue ethics are the most ambitious work in the philosophical tradition addressing the critical question facing feminism—and contemporary political theory generally—today: the purpose and limits of equality" (202). Martha Nussbaum, Janice Raymond, Julia K. Ward, Mary Dietz, and Lorraine Code all look to Aristotle's theory as an alternative to "autonomy-centered theories" of the liberal state that originated in Enlightenment thought and prevail in current moral and political discourse. These theories rest on a conception of subjectivity in which separateness and self-sufficiency are the highest goals and people are regarded as "rational, self-conscious agents" and "the bearers of rights" who must be protected from other "equally self-serving" individuals (Code 77). However, many commentators have noted that this nominal liberal subject, disembodied and "universal" in order to ensure a theoretical "equality" and interchangeability, nevertheless remains gendered, raced, and classed. Furthermore, they argue that the "formal sameness" that should guarantee "fairness" through interchangeability actually "impede[s] the development of conceptual tools for coping with politically and morally significant differences" by permitting only "a pale, pluralistic liberal toleration: a bare recognition of difference-in-isolation" (Code 80).

By contrast, feminist theorists argue that Aristotle's relational ethics allow for a reimagination of intersubjectivity and community on more egalitarian bases.[44] In her critique of Richard Rorty's "untenable" distinction between public and private, for example, Dianne Rothleder turns to Aristotle's notion of perfect friendship. Briskly discarding "the clear sexism and classism of this model," she highlights Aristotle's ideas of the "pleasure" in and "care" for others that inform her notion of "a friendship of play" (123). By modifying Aristotle, Rothleder seeks to avoid "the hyperindividualism" of liberal rights theory, especially the right "not to play" or exclude others, and its converse, "hypercommunitarianism," which privileges groups and rejects individual solitude or predilection (124–25).

A chastened Aristotle also returns in the work of Dietz, who rethinks citizenship from a feminist perspective, and of Code, who explores a postmodern feminist epistemology. Both consider and reject mother-child love as a model for ethical social relations, though it held significant sway in the 1970s and 1980s. They argue that the maternal model is asymmetrical, inextricable from the power relations and the history of the Oedipal family, and maintains a public/private distinction that keeps politics out of the family and women out of the public sphere. Both prefer an Aristotelian model of friendship that is based in equality or equity on the one hand and in particularity and sociability on the other and requires an epistemology or means of knowing ourselves as well as knowing others that is intellectual as well as affective (Code 99).[45] They recognize, however, that this requires a "generous" and "open" reading of Aristotle that involves seeing beyond his elitist and sex-specific strictures for citizenship (Dietz 27; Code 99). Taken in this light, Aristotle's ideas provide a paradigm for affiliation that is specifically situated (non-essential), politically and morally engaged, and anchored in the recognition of "second persons," a belief in the importance of other people in our development (Code 100–101) that echoes Aristotle's formulation of the friend as a "second self."