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Published: Spring 2005

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Copyright (c) 2005 by the University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.




Introduction
Multiple Nations, Multiple Martís, 1895-1921

On February 24, 1905, citizens of the Cuban Republic gathered under a thick blanket of dense, gray clouds in Havana's Central Park. They eagerly awaited the presentation of Cuba's first marble statue of José Martí. The occasion also marked the tenth anniversary of the start of Cuba's third and final war for independence from Spain. Together with General Máximo Gómez, the rebels' commander in chief, José Martí had launched the war on that very day in 1895 when he issued the Grito de Baire, the official call to arms. Killed in his first military encounter with loyalist troops less than three months later, Martí had been one of the revolutionary movement's key organizers and principal ideologues since the mid-1880s. Despite his intense activism and prolific writing on behalf of independence, Martí's long fifteen-year exile in the United States and Spain's censorship of his works had effectively limited knowledge of his work among Cubans on the island. Still, thanks in part to the return of Martí's fellow emigrés to Cuba at the end of the war in 1898, Martí's fame was growing. Although plans to erect a monument to Martí had been in the works since 1899, building of the monument had been stalled for years. A lack of funds was not the main problem; rather, it was the uncertainty of Cuba's political destiny itself.

Instead of independence and political sovereignty, the end of the war in 1898 brought a four-year U.S. military occupation followed by a pro-U.S. republican administration. The latter proved deeply reluctant to implement any revolutionary reforms. Moreover, the U.S. Congress's imposition of the Platt Amendment to the 1901 Cuban Constitution as a condition for military withdrawal effectively granted the United States the right to intervene whenever it deemed that Cuba's domestic policies were endangering its interests. Regardless of what they thought of Martí's contributions to the war or how differently they viewed the future that they hoped to build, Martí's former comrades-in-arms now faced an embarrassing reality. Commemorating the death of Martí on the anniversary of the 1895 War's original call to arms implied honoring the birth of a nation. Yet, the long-term viability and security of that nation remained dubious at best.

The uncertainty of Cuba's sovereignty and the precariousness of its internal harmony may actually help explain the basis of Martí's appeal. Two years earlier, a law had established the date of Martí's death on May 19, 1895, as a national day of mourning. Yet, the Cuban National Congress did not begin to hold "solemn sessions" in which a keynote speaker intoned the memory of Martí until after the erection of the monument in 1905. That year became pivotal. Over the next two decades, commemorations of all kinds would become commonplace, despite the fact that concerns about Cuba's sovereignty and social stability never went away. Indeed, as U.S. economic and political intervention intensified, these concerns only deepened. Reflections on the historical role and meaning of Martí, public and private, collective and personal, increased in proportion to external challenges and internal political strife as time wore on.

Passionate and tireless in his writing and strategizing on behalf of independence in the years before the war, Martí had called incessantly for social unity amidst ideological division. He prophesied the need for vigilance against U.S. pretensions and demanded the casting aside of personal interest for the sake of revolution and a just society. Cuba would be a republic "with all and for all," Martí had famously pledged. Standing in the shadow of the life-size marble Martí in Havana's Central Park, Tomás Estrada Palma, the first president of the Republic, reminded his audience of Martí's promise that February day in 1905. Yet, General Gómez remained largely silent. His silence attested to many Cubans' alienation from Estrada Palma's government as well as his own. Since taking power in 1902, Estrada Palma's administration had come to rely on violence to repress its critics and adamantly rejected any policies that might have subverted Cuba's colonial legacies. The Cuba of 1905 was becoming a nation that only a small number of independence activists might have imagined.

In his keynote address in honor of Martí, Estrada Palma noted his government's active support for Spanish immigration and foreign investment as the solutions to Cuba's historic social inequalities and economic problems. Rather than breaking up the plantation system, redistributing land to veterans, or providing native-owned businesses with state protection and the financial credit to compete with foreign firms, Estrada Palma promised greater advantages to the very groups that had long held sway in Cuba's economy and society.[1] Many former revolutionaries in the crowd must have found the president's speech appalling. After so much struggle and bloodshed, little seemed to have changed.

Far from unique, this official, state-sponsored manipulation of José Martí in 1905 and the paradoxical celebration of his image by Cubans who had become each other's political opponents are deeply emblematic of an ingrained pattern in Cuban history. To specialists, students, and even casual observers of Cuba, the historic tendency of Cuban political activists to appropriate Martí's image and interpret his words for their own purposes is well known.[2] In fact, from his death until today, the proliferation of new works on or by Martí has increased at the rate of 140 titles per annum.[3] Although many of the works on Martí remain hagiographic, a number of scholars have begun to read Martí's actions and words with a more critical eye. Placing them in historical context, these works consider the degree to which Martí constructed his projects for the liberation of Cuba and Latin America from all forms of colonialism in ambivalent, even ambiguous terms.[4] These terms seem to have invited multiple interpretations and, as one scholar remarked, "[to have created] several Martís."[5] When I began researching this book, this was precisely the phenomenon that I wanted to explain. As I started my work, I realized that the mythification of Martí and the process of nation-building were inextricably tied. I also noticed that a proliferation of works on Martí and interpretations of his writings accompanied increasing social upheavals between 1895 and 1921, the year that marked the consolidation of U.S. neocolonialism in Cuba. Who were these multiple Martís to the first generations of Cubans who crafted their images? Why did understanding and explaining Martí to one another become so important? What did these multiple Martís signify?

This book argues that competing interpretations of José Martí represented different, conflicting interpretations of nation. It is for this reason that Martí became the principal touchstone for the expression and debate of Cuban national sentiments during the first decades of the Republic. Yet, an analysis of the evolving images of Martí is not the central story of this book. Rather, such images serve as critical guideposts that direct our understanding of how different political sectors justified and conceived their actions, ideological differences, and objectives from Martí's lifetime through 1921. By 1921, the collapse of Cuba's sugar economy and the resulting financial dependence of the Cuban state on loans, aid, and direct support from the United States illustrated at an economic level what had been apparent politically for years. That is, Cuba's revolutionary leadership of the 1895 War had presided over the demise of Martí's elusive promise of a nation with which all Cubans could identify and in which all counted themselves as principal constituents. By 1921, they had presided over the stillbirth rather than the birth of a republic. In that same year, the Cuban state formally codified the status of Martí as Cuba's principal national hero, granting him monopoly rights to the title of "Apostle" and requiring all Cuban citizens to honor Martí on the date of his birth in legally prescribed ways.[6] That the consolidation of the image of Martí as a state-controlled icon occurred in the same year that the state's legitimacy and that of its ex-revolutionary leaders reached historic lows was no coincidence. Rather, the efforts of Cuba's political elites to stake an exclusive claim to Martí's legacy and to control interpretations of Martí belied the desperation of their position and how little control they actually had. By 1921, political leaders who voiced the origin of their authority as leaders personally endowed by Martí with the right to rule faced an increasingly incredulous and hostile Cuban public, many of whom no longer cared to listen and had developed their own, alternative images of Martí.

This work offers no authoritative understanding of what Martí meant. Nor does it provide a definitive sense of the extent to which Martí's successors fulfilled his vision, because it makes no claims as to what precisely that vision entailed in terms of a political system or economy. Rather, this book focuses on the discursive and practical battles over the shape and direction of the nation following Martí's death. To do this, it begins by suggesting how and why Martí drew support for the cause of the 1895 War from ideologically and historically divided sectors through a discourse of social unity that was as much messianic as it was pragmatic. Meant to appeal to Cubans with opposing points of view before the war, this discourse became critical to how Cubans demanded the implementation of their own visions of nation and expectations for the Republic afterward. In the early Republic, references to Martí and claims to his legacy became the fundamental means by which Cuban nationalists of conflicting ideological positions discredited each other. They highlighted their differences and charged one another with betraying their respective views of nation through competing images of Martí. Over time, as conflicts and divisions grew, Martí became increasingly important. A commitment to his image and the nostalgia for a past whose future had still not been determined became the primary means through which political opponents could "talk" to each other and offer each other the basis for mutual accord. Eventually, however, the potential for reaching such an accord and the offers that political opponents extended came to seem as ethereal and symbolic as Martí himself.

In short, this work contends that the mythification of Martí through patriotic rituals and discourses became critical to the survival and articulation of distinct, ideal views of nation that emerged during the 1895 War. Yet, at the same time, it argues that conflicting views of the nation predated the myth of Martí even as they became bound up in it. Martí came to embody the requirement of social unity behind the cause of the 1895 War—independence—that lay at the heart of each of these ideal "nations." When politically active Cubans transferred their energies from the cause of independence from Spain to fulfilling the cause of their own respective ideal of nation in the state, Martí became the vehicle through which they voiced demands for conformity to their respective view. By "re-membering" Martí into their particular vision of nation, these Cubans derived contradictory lessons from Martí's life and words. Through Martí, they filtered these lessons into memories of the 1895 Revolution that served to justify current approaches to the present and future. They also demanded that others conform to the validity of those approaches.

I first visited and lived in Cuba between 1995 and 1998. Not surprisingly, the hundred-year anniversaries of Martí's death and the deaths of equally important martyrs such as the mulatto general Antonio Maceo meant that memories of the 1895 War and its culmination in a U.S. military occupation seemed very much on everyone's mind. At the time, I was researching my dissertation in Cuba and lived with my family in the turn-of-the-century neighborhood known as Centro Habana. Once the residential area of choice for the senators and congressmen of the First Republic, its buildings now sagged with the burden of history and the weight of so many generations' disillusionment. Never did the memory of Martí or the struggles of the early Republic seem very far away.

Only a few blocks down from the peasant market where I shopped lay the area of Centro Habana called Cayo Hueso, or Key West. Named for the thousands of cigarmakers (tabaqueros) who immigrated to Florida in the 1880s and returned to Cuba after the war, Cayo Hueso once teemed with the radicalism of organized workers in the early twentieth century. The views and labor activism of these emigré tabaqueros had inspired the formulation of Martí's vision of social justice and, as my own research soon revealed, triggered many of the Republic's early conflagrations. Often, I savored the irony that whether I was coming or going, relaxing or working, it always seemed that there was no way to avoid Martí. Twice a day, on my way to and from Cuba's National Archive, I walked past the Central Park monument to Martí and the house of his birth. Like many Cubans had done before me and many still do today, I began to imagine how Martí might react to events of the day and situations of the past. Constantly, I wondered whether he would have lived up to his own myth as a compromiser, radical nationalist, political savior, and social unifier had he, in fact, lived. Every day, it seemed I had a different answer to this question.

As a historian, I knew that I would never find a single answer. As a Cuban (at least by desire, if not by birth), I felt I knew the origin of the question, Would the Republic and Cuba's twentieth-century history have been different if Martí had lived? To me, the question derived from a profound sense, highly promoted in the works of Martí, that Cubans should always be united. Yet, today as yesterday, it seemed to me that we never were. Cubans in the 1895 War had not fought Spain just as Cubans in the Republic had not fought each other for the same, unified vision of nation. Rather, they had fought, sometimes in alliance across race and class, sometimes divided by race and class, for multiple visions of nation. The coexistence of conflicting, multiple images of Martí in the Republic typified the emergence and struggle among Cubans for multiple images of nation. Martí's brilliance as a political strategist and organizer lay in his recognition that Cubans had drastically, almost irreconcilably, different ideas of what Cuban society should be like after the war. These ideas ranged from a modernist, liberal version of the plantation-dominated past with little if any change in the social hierarchy to a complete subversion of that past.

In life as in death, Martí's appeal lay in the discourse of social unity that he forged in order to mitigate the immediate impact of these conflicts on preparations for war. Martí emphasized the power of the collective political will and individual self-sacrifice as the means for resolving differences. Social unity was Martí's mantra, and as such, it made him a fiercely seductive symbol whose appropriation became increasingly necessary for competing political sectors in the Republic as they became more divided. Martí had promised to found a republic for all. However, he never explained the form of government the republic should take. As he himself admitted only days before his death, Martí did not explicitly promise democracy, but the honesty and sincerity of his and other leaders' personal authority.[7] Whatever Martí may have meant, Cubans quickly discovered after the war that democracy and personal authority were not the same thing. Proponents of political democracy as well as those who favored authoritarian forms of order each found in Martí the legitimacy and authenticity of their vision of the state and the nation for which they fought.

Every time Cubans collectively honored Martí in the face of growing conflicts among themselves, they articulated their right to implement their vision of nation through the state. By invoking Martí as a the hallmark of social unity, Cubans periodically asserted that they had once all agreed on what these views and plans for the nation were and committed themselves to fighting for its fulfillment, no matter what the cost. Nonetheless, as many historians of Cuba's long and complex independence process (1868-98) have demonstrated, questions of strategy and ideology and the political objectives of independence divided rather than unified the leadership as well as the rank and file.[8] Social unity was more fiction than historical reality, but one that framed and conditioned people's actions in that reality.

In this sense, between 1895 and 1921, the "myth" that Cubans constructed of José Martí as a signifier of social unity was a fictional narrative, based on their desire for a harmonious, even utopic future as well as the need to shape and recollect the past in such terms. This book contends that just because a narrative was not necessarily born of facts does not mean that it was not "true" to those who articulated it. As William Doty argues, "Our myths are fictional, to be sure, but … fictional need not mean unreal."[9] For politically active Cubans in the early twentieth century, the myth of Martí did not make him the father of social unity but the embodiment of social unity. Ultimately, belief in this myth became as true and as real as belief in distinct ideals of nation. As mainstream political parties' efforts to claim exclusive rights to state power led to the ideological and structural decay of the republican order in the early 1920s, a new generation of Cubans would have to decide whether or not these ideals of nation they had inherited were still worth fighting for.

This study uses the term "myth" to connote the common essence or root of Cubans' nationality in the repeated narrative of self-sacrifice, collective struggle, and commitment to a "nation for all" that emerged during the War of 1895. Little by little since the time of his death, Cuban politicians, social activists, and intellectuals incarnated this narrative in the figure of José Martí. The process eventually culminated in the 1920s with a duel between opposing images of Martí that Cuban nationalists performed and ritualized. And, as with all myths, its meaning depended on the desires of myth-tellers.[10] It became the shared creation myth from which each political sector's interpretation of the nation was derived. The myth of Martí anticipated the future of Cuba, "determin[ing] and shap[ing] ideals and goals for both the individual and society."[11] With increasing intensity, it functioned in Cuban society much as foundational national myths about the Pilgrims' good intentions toward the Indians or the inevitability of the conquest of the West have functioned in U.S. society for years: it became "both true and crucial to those who perceive[d] it through their experienced world."[12]

As with possibly all national mythologies, myths of creation are also frequently coupled with myths of destruction.[13] Thus, this work contends that the myth of Martí as social unity connected conflicting visions of nation to each other by positing a common origin or foundation. Yet, it also connoted an apocalyptic myth that forecast the destruction of the shared foundations of Cuban nationality if people protested too vehemently or broke ranks with other Cubans for "sectoral" reasons. When Cuban activists attacked each other through discourse or armed revolt in the early Republic, they often did so in all-or-nothing terms. Opposition to a certain political position could be considered not only threatening or antithetical to the interests of Cuba but also a betrayal of the sacred standard for judging cubanidad: one's commitment to social unity and one's belief in José Martí.

This study seeks to track and make sense of Cubans' competing claims to define and implement the nation. It analyzes these claims through key political sectors' discourses on the nation and the actions they took that justified and illuminated those discourses in the name of Martí. I argue that Cuban supporters, participants, and leaders of the 1895 Revolution were nationalists because they conceived of what they did and their relationship to each other as intimately connected to the long-term goal of designing and building a particular, unique vision of state and society all their own. During the 1895 War and after it, each of these groups operated under a set of assumptions about the Revolution, their place within it, and the right they earned for their support of it to build a new society on their own terms. These assumptions about the past, present, and future that linked individuals and groups of Cubans into an armed social and political movement formed the nexus of different Cuban nationalisms. The goal of seeing them implemented in a new society guided by a new state motivated proponents of independence to confront and attack the colonial state in the 1890s. Very similar goals motivated activists to confront and attack the republican state from 1902 to 1921.

Explaining the Origins of Conflicting Visions of Nation in the Early Republic

The product of a slave regime predicated on the innate social worth of whites and the inherent inferiority of blacks, nineteenth-century Cuba was a society in which ideals of social hierarchy and elites' surveillance of people of color, both slave and free, permeated nearly all aspects of daily life and culture.[14] Because of this, Cubans experienced a protracted independence process that was crippled by extreme racial tensions and divided political visions of how these tensions might be held in check from the start. Until the late 1860s, white Creole elites grudgingly traded the benefits of political autonomy for the comforts of social control that Spanish colonialism provided over slaves, free blacks, and the urban and rural poor, many of whom were of mixed race. Indeed, so important had social control over these populations been to planters that they often contemplated trading one imperialism for another and, in the 1840s and 1850s, actively sought the island's annexation to the United States.[15]

Because of this history, Cubans of varying social conditions who came to favor independence in the 1860s and 1870s did so for radically different reasons and ends in mind. Begun in 1868 with the Ten Years' War (1868-78), the struggle for Cuban independence and national sovereignty came at a time when slavery and sugar remained the cornerstones of the island economy and its color-class hierarchy. Facing high prices for slaves caused by a reduced supply, increasing competition from European beet sugar, and the inefficiency of unmechanized mills, a small group of Creole planters came to consider separation from Spain beneficial in 1868 for a specific set of highly personal reasons. They saw in their own experience of menacing poverty and technological backwardness a microcosm of Cuba's future. Thus, decades after independence had been achieved in nearly every former colony of Spanish America, these Creole planters freed their slaves in order to fight a revolution that they hoped would primarily benefit the planters themselves.[16]

However, separatist planters soon found that Cuba's slaves and free people of color quickly transformed the struggle in practical and ideological terms. Casting abolition as the twin goal of independence, the overwhelming numbers of blacks and mulattoes who joined the war between 1868 and 1878 radicalized its social vision. The success of their efforts played into white social fears of a race war à la Haiti, but it also forced Spain to begin a gradual process of reforming, and eventually abolishing, slavery altogether. All along, Spain proved only too willing to exploit the racial fears of whites as a means for discrediting the movement. In the end, these efforts when coupled with slave defiance and the advancement of free blacks within the rebel army itself prompted most white revolutionaries to reach a pact with Spain in 1878. In so doing, they turned their backs on former compatriots of color who remained committed to the cause and continued it through the Guerra Chiquita, or Little War, as late as 1881. Creole leaders signed the Pact of Zanjón in 1878 for the sake of restraining the tide of social change that threatened to sweep over the color-class pyramid of colonial society. They not only feared the radical transformation of society but also that such a transformation would proceed at a pace that they could not control and from which they could not expect to benefit.[17]

Thus, the ambivalence of white separatist leaders impeded the process of transforming the social contradictions of the colony into a more egalitarian national landscape. To a certain extent, Cuba's first two wars for independence only deepened these contradictions. On the one hand, the collapse of these military efforts left open-ended the process of achieving a social consensus among separatist forces on key questions of economic justice, racial equality, and future state support for these ideals. Moreover, the failure of revolutionaries to oust the Spanish appears to have allowed Spain partially and temporarily to co-opt the spaces for greater social, political, and economic participation by marginalized groups that the wars had opened up. Indeed, Spain, rather than a victorious national state, abolished slavery in 1886. Spain, rather than a victorious national state, promulgated the first series of antidiscrimination laws in favor of black civil rights in the late 1880s and early 1890s.[18] And Spain, rather than a victorious national state, tolerated the formation of a powerful anarchist labor movement that initially channeled working-class elements away from independence as a goal and toward engagement with the colonial state for the protection of workers' rights and improved conditions.[19] In short, Spanish officials attempted to co-opt the spaces for change that their opponents and revolutionary critics had traditionally reserved for themselves.

However, the fact that Spain failed to reform the colonial system, eventually abandoned workers' rights altogether, and neglected to enforce laws that would have provided state protection for black concerns only pushed Cubans who demanded radical social change to reconsider independence as a viable political alternative. On the other hand, a number of intellectuals and middle-class professionals and a small number of Creole planters also grew increasingly alienated from Spain during this period. Many of them emigrated abroad as a result. Faced with an ever-more corrupt political system, an economy in shambles, and an outdated infrastructure, these groups of Creole elites felt increasingly marginalized from the centers of colonial power and yearned for the chance to modernize Cuba. By forging independence, they wanted to rid Cuba and themselves of the kind of caste privileges that continued to allow greater economic advantage to Spanish-born immigrants over Creoles.

Fractured and regimented, the colony offered no possibility of liberation or social growth as members of these groups defined it. They therefore began to locate the source of liberation and the meaning of their identity elsewhere, in images of an alternative political entity of communal cooperation that they perceived and articulated differently. Importantly, like the veteran and privileged Creole leaders who joined the new independence movement of the 1890s, workers and former slaves who supported independence continued to espouse a radical set of principles for changing the political, social, and economic landscape. Despite the overwhelming potential they represented to any successful revolutionary state that might have responded to them as a constituency, their enthusiasm for contesting the structural sources of power did not so much sharpen as blunt the enthusiasm of separatist leaders for doing the same. This was the case even as José Martí and the political network of emigré associations he directed from New York organized support for a new revolution in the early 1890s. This continued to be the case even after the War of 1895 broke out. As a result, multiple visions of nation emerged within the same discursive matrix of the revolutionary movement, each constructed in counterposition, if not opposition, to one another's goals. Still, ensuring that disparate visionaries of the nation did not have to surrender differences in their conceptualizations of it was the key to fostering support for a new war. They simply had to tolerate these differences, often silently, for the sake of forging an alliance. Conflicting nationalists later interpreted this tenuous alliance as evidence of having achieved social unity in the 1895 War and embodied that memory in the myth of José Martí.

In the process of preparing and experiencing the war itself, multiple understandings of the elements and ideals that constituted the future political entity of Cuba emerged. Feelings of marginality from the colonial power allowed some pro-independence Creoles of educationally or economically privileged background to identify in the struggle for independence with social groups far more marginalized than they. Others, however, retained a much more socially conservative view of their role as cultural and ideological leaders vis-à-vis the former slaves, organized workers, and intellectuals of color who constituted the Revolution's primary following. As a result, the nation for which each set of actors fought diverged from the nation for which others fought. This situation only intensified when U.S. military intervention in 1898 cut short the process of internal negotiation and consensus among revolutionary forces. This process might have otherwise laid the groundwork for a new, corporatist national state that might have mediated competing needs, interests, and views.

Founding contributors to the study of Cuban history in the United States and Cuba have tended to view U.S. imperialism as an overwhelming force that fragmented and diluted the nationalist aspirations of politically powerful Cubans who decided to accommodate to changing circumstances as best they could.[20] Thus, as Louis A. Pérez Jr. argues in his most recent work, On Becoming Cuban, so completely did the United States come to dictate the framework and terms of Cubans' "moral universe" that Cuban identity itself emerged as a cultural derivative of the more fixed and consciously secure imperial identity of the United States.[21] Other historians of Cuba have relied on economic and material approaches in order to demonstrate the depth of U.S. control before 1959. Seeing the Republic through a teleological lens, many have argued that the socialist outcome of Cuba's struggle for sovereignty ultimately represented the fulfillment of the kind of society proposed by José Martí.[22] More recently, revisionist historians such as Aline Helg, Ada Ferrer, Alejandro de la Fuente, and Marial Iglesias Utset have begun to analyze the course of the Republic in terms of the actions and complex changing political consciousness of local actors.[23] In particular, Helg, Ferrer, and de la Fuente focus on the role that race and racial prejudice played in shaping Cuba's independence process and its implications for the political development of the Republic. These historians question the degree to which a consensus on the role of race in relation to the political and social development of postindependence society emerged among revolutionaries in the 1895 War.

Despite their differences of approach and emphasis, both traditional and revisionist historians of Cuba inevitably confront and explain the contradiction between political discourses of racial and social inclusion forged during the 1895 War and state practices of exclusion during the Republic. All these historians explore the relative power of the Cuban state to implement visions of nation, not only in relation to U.S. imperial mandates but also with regard to different groups of Cubans who defied its authority. In all cases, they have found the power of the Cuban state wanting, crippled by pressures for social change from within and demands for conformity from without.

In this regard, my own study is no different. It plots an analytical path between the polarities of promise and betrayal inherent in the Cuban political process of the early twentieth century. And like Pérez's On Becoming Cuban, this book seeks to tap the political culture and consciousness of Cubans as contributors and participants in the building of a neocolonial society. However, it argues that, at the time of the 1895 War, Cubans had already developed a sense of themselves as "Cuban." After the United States' imposition of a neocolonial framework within which Cubans struggled to construct a nation, they asserted the historical origins of their conflicting visions of nation and policed its boundaries through political action as well as discursive means. They reserved the right to define what being "Cuban" meant. The cult of Martí emerged because Cubans refused to surrender their memory, however nostalgic or fictional, of total unity and deployed it offensively as well as defensively in their struggles with one another. As Ernest Renan argues for all peoples engaged in a project of nation-building, Cubans recognized that "of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are." They desired to "have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, … to perform still more."[24] During the first two decades of the Republic, Cubans often accused each other, rather than the United States, of representing the primary threat to building a nation.

Thus, this work demonstrates that it was Cubans' commitment to nation-building on conflicting terms rather than the subversion of nation-building by U.S. imperialism that formed the central axis of Cuba's social and political development until 1921. It argues that Cuban nationalists engaged, manipulated, and even legitimated the role of U.S. imperialists in Cuba's internal governance for two reasons. First, they sought to blunt the appeal of rival nationalisms, and second, they wanted to neutralize the authenticity of their proponents' historical claims to acquire or retain state power. Ultimately, by 1921, Cuban nationalists' efforts to gain greater power and authority over one another in the context of U.S. imperialism ensured U.S. neocolonial hegemony at all levels of Cuban society.

The following section explains the role and definition of these concepts of "nation" and "nationalism" as well as the categories of analysis that appear in this work. It also defines the elements that characterized the three central Cuban nationalisms and each group of nationalists' interpretation of the myth of José Martí.

Theorizing Nations and Nationalism: The Case of Early Twentieth-Century Cuba

Recently, the concepts of nation and nationalism have acquired negative connotations in "the West."[25] Similarly, imperialism, arguably the manifestation of U.S. nationalism abroad, continues to be a dirty little word in the lexicon of most U.S. Americans. Few understand why Latin Americans, especially Cubans, refuse to share this view. Yet, national projects for advancing a society's economic and political interests, whether imperial or anti-imperial, have long relied on collective, society-wide validation of the idea that such plans would be good for the "nation." According to Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner, nations and nationalisms developed in the nineteenth century because these concepts bridged the ideological chasm opened up by the collapse of agrarian, monarchical societies in Europe and the development of industry, mechanical communication, and notions of modernity. Thus, elites who already wielded considerable power invented and promoted ideas of nation in order to retain control of the state.[26] Refining these earlier arguments, Benedict Anderson subsequently articulated a key idea that few scholars, if any, had been willing to recognize: that is, the location of the origins of nations and nationalism in the human imagination.[27] However, a central problem remained: Anderson and his predecessors promoted a largely Eurocentric and elite-centered standard by which to judge when and how nationalisms and nations emerge as well as the form they take. Ideas of nation always seemed to "trickle down" to the masses.

As Florencia Mallon argues, Anderson's idea that nations were "imagined communities" still relied on "the twin myths of bourgeois and Western exceptionalism."[28] Mallon challenges these myths by arguing that nationalism is an open-ended discourse, "a political and intellectual process" in which struggles for power and struggles over meaning are deeply enmeshed. Thus, Mallon explains, elites and subalterns, states and communities are never freed from each other, or even capable of existing in a stable way without each other. When a state becomes hegemonic, as in the case of Mexico, it does so through the participation of all groups. For as long as they remain committed to being parts of a historically rooted but ever-changing concept of nation, they remain connected to one another because their projects, goals, and identities are connected.[29]

In the case of early twentieth-century Cuba, efforts to build a strong nation-state based on a more equitable distribution of power and wealth failed. Eventually by the 1920s, the hegemony and sovereignty of U.S. imperialism usurped the hegemony and sovereignty of the Cuban state. How did Cuban politicians as well as workers, black activists, veterans, intellectuals, and other popular groups participate in this process? To what degree were they responsible for it? And why did Cubans who were so divided (even to the point of taking up arms against one another) nonetheless invoke the concept of social unity in its singular representative, José Martí?

My own efforts to find answers to these questions began in Cuba's national and provincial archives. Casting my net as widely as possible, I drew up a wealth of personal and public testimonies. Poring over them, breathing in the emotions that produced them, it seemed to me that they all attested to the same thing. During and after the last war for independence, Cubans consistently addressed the past even as they railed against or confirmed the present. In diaries, letters, manifestos, newspapers, secret police reports, and the like, Cubans seemed to speak past each other, toward a truth that they imagined differently and remembered differently. This truth, by their own account, was the nation. Ranging from the sublime to the palpable, the ubiquitous to the elusive, the nations that Cubans talked about were the lenses through which they justified their political activity and its relationship to their social condition. Over time, I came to believe that Cubans often talked past each other in speaking about the nation because they had, in fact, not only imagined different nations but also felt that they had begun to experience what life would be like in such nations during the 1895 War. In 1898, the process of negotiating, incorporating, and refuting differences for the sake of forming a single national project was cut short by the intrusion of a foreign power. From that moment on, the evolution of Cuban nationalisms and the development of U.S. imperialism—both processes that had been taking place simultaneously before the 1895 War—became ensnared. The contradictions between Cubans' visions of nation and the contradictions within early forms of U.S. imperialism were joined.

In preparing this work, I conceived of the nation much as my archival sources indicated they had conceived it. That is, the nation was nothing more and nothing less than the mental location of liberation in the form of a political entity and a community yet to be achieved. At one level, this meant that while the nation was a goal that its proponents cast as eminently achievable, it was also a project constantly under construction and, depending on circumstances and the reactions of others, subject to revision and modification. Implied in these projects were locally derived, historically contingent, and even personally specific definitions of liberation.

For example, some Cubans, like lower- and working-class black veterans, defined liberation as the equalization of historic injustices through the redistribution of wealth and political power. Others equated liberation with freedom from the backward policies and customs of the Spanish. For them, liberation meant being modern, prosperous, and culturally respectable in ways already idealized in countries that were "modern," such as the United States. With these definitions of liberation as their guides, Cubans located its fulfillment in visions of nation that they struggled with and against each other to achieve.

The first of these, pro-imperialist nationalism, was championed by white, formally educated, middle- and upper-class emigrés who left Cuba in the 1870s and early 1880s, either because they had supported previous independence wars or had suffered economically from their results. Having spent most of their adult lives in the United States and Europe before supporting the 1895 War and returning to Cuba shortly afterward, pro-imperialist nationalists hoped to bring the physical technology and cultural features of modernity to Cuban society. They envisioned a nation shaped by foreign investment, large-scale agriculture, and state-sponsored acculturation of the masses to European and American standards of "civilization." Pro-imperialist nationalists advocated and measured others by cultural standards that they believed they themselves had already achieved.

Largely citizens of the United States themselves, pro-imperialist nationalists were "imperialist." Although they did not see annexation of Cuba to the United States as necessary or even desirable, they proposed that both Cuba and the United States benefit from an intimate economic and cultural relationship that constricted the boundaries of Cuba's political sovereignty. Yet, these same groups were equally "nationalist." They saw in the Hispanic dimensions of Creole society the rudiments of a greatness that Spain had repressed and that independence would release. Moreover, they believed in U.S. benevolence and expected that U.S. influence, whether diplomatic, economic, or political, could only benefit Cuba's development by improving its chances at achieving the modernizing national liberation they envisioned. For the pro-imperialist nationalists, there was no contradiction between the emigré and Cuban halves of their identities because there was no contradiction between Cuba's national liberation and seeking a close bond with U.S. power and culture.

For example, in 1895 when pro-imperialist nationalists took over the running of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party [PRC]) after Martí left for the war in Cuba, they reflected their understanding of nation in the reports and priorities of the PRC organ, Patria. As editor, Martí had given profiles of working-class or black organizations equal weight with reports on the activism of elite professional revolutionaries.[30] Martí's Patria also marginalized discussion of the United States and U.S. Americans in its pages, preferring to focus exclusively on the social conditions of Cubans and the task of bringing them together. By contrast, pro-imperialist nationalist editors of Patria published article after article on U.S. Americans' support for the war and their ties to elite Cuban revolutionary clubs. They also published essays drawing historical analogues between the United States' and Cuba's struggles for liberty. This new Patria included almost no reports (if any) on La Liga Antillana (Antillean League), the black mutual aid and instructional society Martí had helped to found, and no mention of Haiti.[31]

Significantly, the pro-imperialist nationalists' Patria did not venerate a Martí who sought to mediate social differences among Cubans but one who "purified" those he could not "change" by immersing them along with himself in the "Jordan" of patriotic self-abnegation. In this way, he made them "worthy of the redemptive task"—that is, worthy of inclusion in the Revolution.[32] Buoyed by their own material success and acculturation as one-time immigrants, pro-imperialist nationalists would later adopt a laissez-faire and increasingly repressive approach to social change in the Republic. They did so by interpreting the 1895 War and memories of Martí in terms of self-reliance and self-abnegation. Because they had supported these ideals during the war, pro-imperialist nationalists relied on the same ideals to guide policies of the state with respect to socially marginal "others" like workers and black activists afterward. When they called for social unity, they actually demanded negation of past injustices that certain groups may have suffered for the sake of a more prosperous and modern "whole."

On the other hand, veteran leaders, both white and of color, rooted their revolutionary nationalism in the military experience of the previous independence wars of 1868-78 and 1879-80. They conceived of a nationalism that called for social change through a top-down, state-engineered approach. Revolutionary nationalists envisioned a nation that transferred patron-client systems of social interaction that they associated with memories of the rebel army and the ideal culture of Cuba's rural life to the realm of state-society politics. They deferred to this patriarchal model and its attendant memories as they confronted issues of race or class and subsumed both dimensions of their own identities to its rubrics. Laced with authoritarian aspects, commitment to a vertically organized, electoral democracy formed the core of this revolutionary nation.

Consequently, revolutionary nationalists interpreted the nation and called other Cubans to unite around it through a Martí who promised to create a society of equals so long as the Cuban masses, those who had been "unequal" in the past, promised to respect their leaders' authority. General-in-Chief Máximo Gómez provided one of the best illustrations of this when he ordered his troops, in June 1896, to commemorate the death of Martí. When his forces passed near the place where Martí had been shot by Spanish soldiers the year before, Gómez drove a cross into the site where Martí had fallen from his horse, fatally wounded. Gómez had ordered the cross, engraved with Martí's initials, to be made for the occasion. After staking it into the ground, Gómez instructed each soldier to pick up a stone and lay it, one by one, at the foot of the cross, his voice reportedly cracking under the weight of his emotions. After Gómez had finished speaking, one of his assistants, Fermín Valdés Domínguez (who was also a childhood friend of Martí), said, "This modest monument [should] be an altar on which we all may come to sing the hymn of … victory, … to glorify Martí, dead, who was the Revolution, and Gómez, conqueror, who was the War."[33] The only role left to the soldiers was that of obedient bystanders: this nation depended on the understanding that ultimate authority and ultimate legitimacy rested not with the masses but with their leaders.

Importantly, Máximo Gómez, although the supreme leader of Cuba's rebel army, was not himself Cuban by birth but Dominican. However, Gómez's "foreign-ness" and a personal history of having served in the Spanish colonial army stand as evidence of the broad inclusiveness that defined the most explicitly radical form of Cuban nationalism articulated by the leaders of the 1895 War. Indeed, Gómez, Cuban mulatto general Antonio Maceo, and others constructed this nationalism in dialogue with the needs and demands of popular-class followers who pursued independence as a way to ensure profound social change and historic rupture. That Gómez became supreme commander despite his association with the enemy and his alien origins could only have served to strengthen the appeal of the rebel cause. Gómez and others like him typified many soldiers' desire to break cleanly with the past and forge a collective future based on new affiliations and merits derived from the war itself.

By contrast, popular nationalism rooted itself in an ideological amalgam of social desires and models of democracy derived from various historical experiences of marginalization. Proponents included emigré workers in Florida and New York, former soldiers and lower-ranking officers of the 1895 War, black civil rights and labor activists, as well as some popular-class and middle-class women. During the first years of the Republic, popular nationalists proposed a horizontal vision of nation in which the state prioritized the needs of its citizens and rewarded those who had suffered not only in war for its existence but also under Spanish colonialism. During the war and after it, popular nationalists who appropriated Martí depicted him as a spiritual messiah who promised an ideal but achievable society on earth. Appreciative of Martí's efforts to overcome class and racial prejudices through common morality, working-class and lower-middle-class emigrés from Florida were among the first popular nationalists to appropriate Martí in this way. In 1897, for example, Wenceslao Galvez projected a protectionist, paternal, and just nation through a messianic version of the myth of Martí:

Where is he? In all places. Perhaps he is God? Who knows! What is certain is that he is everywhere, in homes, on the street, in the councils, [revolutionary] Clubs, newspapers, in short, everywhere… . His portrait is in all Cuban homes, in all the establishments… . In the home of the most powerful and that of the most humble, he is there, sometimes in his full person, sometimes only as a bust and of him the white and the black speak with cariño… . The only great man who is not censured by the small! … "Oh, if only he lived!" is heard in moments of anguish, because if he lived there would be no obstacles or anything in the way. Oh, if only he lived! His shadow protects us, his shadow extends itself over all things, and there is no Cuban on the face of the earth to whom he does not appear at the hour of sleep, who has him at the head of his bed, and it is because he is the Cuban soul, he is the soul of the fatherland.[34]

The following chapter explores the origins of Cuban nationalisms in the 1890s. It examines the role of José Martí in the process of combining emergent visions of nation into a discourse and a practice of social unity. It also anticipates the implications that this entanglement held for the way in which Cubans began to weave remembrances of history into the process of history-making itself between 1895 and 1921.