224 pp., 61/8 x 91/4, notes, bibl., index
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Turning Right in the Sixties The Conservative Capture of the GOP by Mary C. Brennan Copyright
(c) 1995
by the University of North Carolina Press. All
rights reserved.
The Republican Party, plagued by philosophical, geographical,
and socioeconomic differences among its members, struggled through an
identity crisis in the late 1950s and early 1960s that eventually shifted
power internally from liberals to conservatives. The battle could not have
been won, however, without the assistance of right-wingers outside the
party structure. Uniting to form a more effective force, numerous conservative
intellectuals, local groups, and journalists worked together to promote
conservatives within the political system. Realizing that they needed
each other to achieve power, right-wing politicians and ideologues formed
an uneasy alliance based on political expediency.
This alliance created the potential for a vibrant conservative movement,
but the new unity of the various strains of conservatism was tenuous at
best. Traditionalists, libertarians, anticommunists, and right-wing politicians
worked together when it suited their purposes but remained firmly
committed to their individual agendas. In the 1950s and early 1960s, conservatives
recognized the benefits of cooperation and joined forces to create
a stronger conservative movement, but their lack of practical experience
impeded their efforts. This explains, in part, why they did not gain
power until well into the 1960s.
Ideological disputes had bitterly divided the Republican Party since the
stock market crash Of 1929. The Great Depression exposed the weaknesses
of Republican "trickle-down" economics and the inflexibility of
Herbert Hoover's philosophy and policies. It also cost the GOP its reputation
and the presidency. More importanly, the 1932 election of Franklin
D. Roosevelt placed in office a man who embodied all that conservatives
despised. Using the Constitution as a guidebook rather than a bible,
FDR revolutionized the presidency, laid the foundations of the welfare
state, and introduced Keynesianism to the economy. Although many of
his policies expanded programs developed by Republicans during the
Progressive Era, appalled right-wingers tried desperately to block his initiatives.
Just as conservatives of both parties had begun to form a solid
bulwark against the New Deal, World War II broke out, halting further
expansion of the Rooseveltian policies but ensuring the continuation of
the Democratic administration.(1)
Republicans achieved more success in the postwar years. In 1946 they
gained control of Congress and prevented FDR'S successor, Harry Truman,
from expanding the New Deal. Tbey also discovered that anticommunism
could unite their party and inspire voters. Crusaders against the
"Red Menace" at home and abroad undermined the Democratic Party by
charging that both the party and its platform were "soft on commununism,"
thereby playing a role in the Republican capture of White House in
1952. Seen by much of the public as a conservative victory, the election of
Dwight Eisenhower appeared to quiet the disputes within the party and to
herald a new era of bipartisanship.
Just as the consensus of the 1950s proved to be an illusion, however, so
the surface tranquility of the Republican Party hid intense factionalism.
In part, this factionalism grew out of geographic and socioeconomic differences
that, although not always openly acknowledged, divided Republicans.
Throughtout the postwar period, members of what conservatives
labeled the "Eastern Establishment" dominated the party. Tbese Republicans
shared a common background of Ivy League educations, exclusive
club memberships, and financial success. Operating many of the major
corporations of the United States, they controlled the purse strings of the
party and of any candidate who wanted to win on the national level. Although
some members were from outside the Northeast, such as Thomas
Dewey and Wendell Willkie, they had only succeeded after they moved to
the East. Members of the "Establishment," assuming that they knew what
was best for the entire country, held sway through their occupation of
policy-making positions throughout the executive branch as well as their
manipulation of the party machinery.(2)
By the 1950s, however, business people and political leaders from the
South and West increasingly challenged these power brokers within the
GOP. Rich Texas oil tycoons and people who had profited from the postwar
industrial boom in the Southwest demanded greater influence at the
national level. They believed that the burgeoning population and economy
of their region entitled them to play a more important role in the formulation
of policy decisions. Joining with midwesterners who also felt excluded
from the "Establishment," these southern and western men and women
began to coalesce into what Arizona senator Barry Goldwater described as
a new populist movement.(3)
The geographic and socioeconomic distinctions between the two
groups contributed to their formation of different ideological and practical
goals as well. Following in the tradition of Theodore Roosevelt's
progressivism,
many members of the wealthy "Eastern Establishment" embraced
New Deal-style social and economic programs in the belief that such
policies would alleviate class conflicts, lead to economic stability, and keep
governmental control in their hands. They envisioned what historian Robert
Griffith has called a "corporate commonwealth." Believing it necessary
to "come to grips with the problems of twentieth-century life," these people
"worked out a program" that was, according to Eisenhower supporter
Paul Hoffman, "better than anything the Democrats could offer."(4) As a
result, "liberal" and/or "moderate" Republicans accepted the framework
of the New Deal, created some new programs, and strove to maintain and
expand American economic involvement around the world.
This program appalled the growing number of conservatives in the
Southwest who stressed individual initiative over welfare programs, preferred
free enterprise rather than government regulation, and desired a
return to local control over matters such as schools, taxes, and race
relations.
Fearing communism at home, they advocated all means of exposing
and eliminating real or potential traitors. In their eagerness to uncover
left-wing
agents, some right-wingers shocked other party members with their
willingness to violate civil rights and liberties.
Although most on the right supported this domestic agenda, conservatives
tended to disagree on foreign policy. Some right-wingers advocated a
kind of isolationist, "Fortress America" style of diplomacy, although they
opposed the taxes and bureaucracy necessary to maintain such a defense.
Others wanted the United States to move aggressively to destroy communism
wherever it appeared. Many of these were "Asia-Firsters," who had
traditional business or missionary ties to Asia and thus focused their
attention
on the Far East.(5) Despite such disagreements, conservative political
leaders united whenever necessary to fight against liberal domination of
the GOP.
The Right had attempted previously to gain control of the party. In
both 1948 and 1952, Ohio senator Robert A. Taft, leader of the conservative
faction in the GOP, had sought the presidential nomination. Poor planning,
a "loser" image, and powerful opponents prevented him from gaining
the prize, however, and left a lingering bitterness in the mouths of
many conservatives. Taft's sudden death in 1953 further weakened the
Right and left them temporarily leaderless and dispirited.(6)
As the right wing of the Republican Party struggled to survive in the
1950s, a conservative movement began to coalesce outside the political
structure. Conservative intellectuals who had long disagreed with one another
found common ground in the struggle against communism. While
maintaining their loyalty to their own philosophies, these intellectuals
recognized
the importance of standing united against liberalism. Essential to
the development of an effective political movement, these men and women
provided the philosophical underpinnings of the new drive for conservatism.
Their growing involvement in the political world offered other conservatives
legitimacy and justification.
During the postwar era, American conservatives generally followed one
of two strands of thought: traditionalism or classical liberalism. Throughout
the early 1950s, conservatives of all varieties concentrated on their
differences rather than their similarities and therefore limited their audience
and impact. Members of each faction behaved that only they truly
understood the cause of the United States' grave troubles.
Traditionalists such as University of Chicago English professor Richard
Weaver, sociologist Robert Nisbet, and Freeman founder Albert Jay
Nock judged the modern Western world distasteful in many respects and
criticized the cult of conformity and the emergence of what they labeled
"mass man." Others, such as political philosopher Leo Strauss and political
scientist John Hallowell, looked back fondly to a time when morality
was the guiding principle of humanity's existence and such concepts as
relativism, positivism, and totalitarianism were unknown. Although they
often disagreed on how to rediscover this so-called golden age, they were
certain that it had existed at some point and that the answers it provided
would miraculously solve the world's problems. Historian Russell Kirk
feared the growth of a "Big Brother" state, but like most traditionalists, he
agreed with Edmund Burke that government played an important role in
community life because in the end "political problems are religious and
moral problems."(9)
Kirk's belief in an active government and his attempts to deemphasize
the Cold War contrasted sharply with the views of classical liberals and
libertarians such as National Review contributing editor Frank Meyer,
Austrian economist Frederick A. Hayek, and creator of the Foundation for
Economic Education Leonard E. Read. These men, through journals,
books, and organizations, preached the gospel of laissez-faire economics
and libertarianism. Their scholarly defense of limited government and a
free-market economy effectively attacked the New Deal and redefined the
postwar economic debate."
In the early 1950s, intellectuals from both camps found common cause
in their fear of the spread of communism abroad, particularly throughout
Asia. The anticommunist movement manifested itself in numerous journal
articles attacking the foreign policy of the Democrats as well as in the
unofficial but powerful China Lobby, which supported the Nationalist
Chinese. Nor did anticommunists approve of all of Eisenhower's foreign
policy decisions. Although Eisenhower worked very hard to maintain their
support, his attempts at arms reduction and his willingness to meet with
Khrushchev undermined his credibility as an enemy of communism.
Many conservatives felt that the president did not understand circumstances
that seemed obvious to them - that, in James Burnham's words,
the "third world war" had already begun.(9)
Extending this crusade onto the domestic front, anticommunists applauded
members of the House Un-American Activities Committee and
cheered the defeat of Alger Hiss and the success of Wisconsin senator
Joseph R. McCarthy. Conservative journals featured stories of alleged
communist infiltration of prominent institutions in American society,
while right-wing authors and citizens scrutinized everyone from senators
to school board officials, whether Democrat or Republican. Anyone with
a questionable background became suspect; anyone who defended the
United States and worked against the communists deserved support and
praise.
The crusade against the "Red Menace" played an essential role in
unifying disagreeing conservative intellectuals and building a grassroots
constituency. No matter what they thought about the domestic situation,
almost everyone on the right - indeed, most Americans - feared communism.
Consequently, the anticommunist crusade created a broad spectrum
of support and provided conservatives with heroes. Besides Senator
McCarthy, whose sensational allegations often made newspaper headlines,
Alger Hiss's nemesis Vice President Richard Nixon and ex-communist
informant Whittaker Chambers became legends in the battle against
the Left. They served as magnets drawing diverse conservative groups
and individuals to the Republican banner.
Anticommunism was not the only factor contributing to the unification
and politicization of conservative intellectuals during the mid- to late
1950s. Equally important were the efforts of the evolving conservative
press. Realizing that the various strands of conservative thought could not
be fused successfully, men such as National Review founders William F.
Buckley, Jr., and Willi Schlamm encouraged right-wing factions to overlook
their differences in order to consolidate their opposition to liberalism.
Along with other conservative writers working for journals such as Human
Events, the Freeman, and the American Mercury, the editors of the National
Review helped acquaint the public with the philosophical and practical tenets
of conservatism as well as with conservative politicians and platforms.
In addition, these journalists gave voice to conservative intellectuals'
frustration
with what they perceived as liberal domination of academia, the
arts, and philosophy. In the process, the right-wing press advertised and
encouraged the resurgence on the right during the 1950s.(10)
Buckley's National Review was more than just a chronicler of contemporary
events. It played a vital role in articulating conservative grievances
and consciously arousing and uniting the various dissatisfied factions.
A devout Catholic from a wealthy family, steeped in conservatism from
childhood, Buckley saw himself as a rebel against the liberal status quo and
a warrior in the struggle against Soviet aggression. He first attacked
liberalism
in 1951 in God and Man at Yale, in which he charged the Yale faculty
with preaching socialism and atheism. A talented speaker and a brilliant
debater, Buckley continued his verbal and published assaults on liberalism
throughout his brief career with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and his pursuit of other business ventures.
Buckley's primary contribution to conservatism came in 1955 with the
founding of the National Review. Bringing together men and women of
widely divergent views, Buckley encouraged them to explain their positions
and to debate the issues. According to publisher William Rusher, the
editors strove to present "a world view, rather than merely a political
philosophy or the theoretical underpinnings of an economic system."(12)
Aimed at intellectuals and opinion-makers, the National Review also appealed
to working-class conservatives. Despite financial difficulties in the
early years, the National Review became the most important conservative
magazine and Buckly the most widely recognized spokesperson of right-wing
thought.
Buckley and other right-wing intellectuals were not the only rebellious
conservatives. By the late 1950s, a right-wing youth movement was becoming
noticeably more vocal. Some of the members of this movement
had discovered conservatism through conservative journals, while others
had joined organizations such as the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists
and the Young Republican National Federation, both of which shifted
dramatically to the right in the late 1950s. M. Stanton Evans, among those
young people caught up in the rising tide on the right, explained in his
book Revolt on the Campus that by 1960 "at least three bursts of rebellion"
occurred against liberalism: "one funneled into the Republican Party, one
into a premature effort at a new national organization, and one into the
exotic recesses of Bohemia." While he admitted that "none did the job" of
turning back the liberal orthodoxy, he believed that each signified youth's
frustration" with the conformity of liberalism."(13)
Indeed, these organized young people, by supporting conservative candidates
on a national level, spreading right-wing literature, and establishing
groups such as the National Student Committee for the Loyalty Oath,
provided an active informed conservative constituency, particularly on
college campuses, throughout the country.(14) By 1960, enough support
existed to create a nationwide conservative youth organization "designed
solely for political action." While this new group, Young Americans for
Freedom, worked independently of partisan ties, the growing conservatism
of the Young Republican organization significantly affected the national
party. By 1959, according to active member William Rusher, the
"biennial [Young Republican] national conventions were recognized as
significant straws in the Republican wind, and there seemed no doubt that
in 1959 the signal would be a shift to the right."(15)
Simultaneously, citizens across the country reacted against what they
regarded as the "monolithic conformity of "liberalism"' in culture and
education as well as liberal politics and economics by forming local and
national groups to combat whichever aspect of liberalism particularly offended
or outraged them.(16) On a local level, antiintegrationist, antiblack,
anti-Semitic, anti-catholic, antifluoridation, and anticommunist as well as
libertarian and free enterprise groups appeared.(17) Funded mostly by a few
major contributors, many of the organizations also depended heavily on
small donations from members.(18) Organizations concentrating on a particular
aspect of a broader cause, such as the American Survival Party and
the Committee to Warn of the Arrival of Communist Merchandise on the
Local Business Scene, had only limited support and impact.(19)
Anticommunist clubs abounded, but single-cause groups had a broader
appeal. Many published their own newsletters or journals in an attempt to
spread their message, build support, and pressure legislators to stop the
growth of liberalism. Although they often reported political events and
usually encouraged political participation, most of these groups despaired
over the lack of differentiation between the national parties. The Congress
of Freedom explained the situation from a grassroots perspective: "running
true to form." the Republicans tried "to emulate the Democratic
Fakers" by enacting more legislation to "siphon off [the] money of its
people to enslave them.(20)
Besides these local groups, a number of national committees and organizations
formed during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Some, such as the
Committee of One Million, focused solely on foreign policy issues. Fred
C. Schwarz and others won thousands of converts by combining a hard-line
attitude toward communism with Christian fundamentalism, neatly
packaged together for the consumer. Other groups were more concerned
about curing domestic ills. The Foundation for Economic Education, the
National Economic Council, and the National Educational Program concentrated
on fighting against collectivism in the government and educating
the American public in conservative economics. In fact, many conservatives
considered the education of the American people "in the values
of freedom [and] our American heritage" to be their primary function.
Moreover, right-wing groups had a responsibility, according to the members
of Constructive Action, to warn the public about "the dangers and
evils inherent in all forms of socialism."(21)
The most significant of these national organizations was the John Birch
Society, founded in 1958 by Robert Welch. The "twin centers" of die society's
ideology were an antistatism that emphasized individualism and local
government and a conspiracy theory warning that certain forces were
attempting to take over the world. According to Welch, these "forces" or
"Insiders" were a modern manifestation of the ancient Illuminati who
wanted to institute worldwide communism.(22) Discounted as fanatics by
many. Democrats and Republicans, members of the society used slick
propaganda techniques and publications, particularly American Opinion,
to build up a significant following that would not be silenced and eventually
could not be ignored.
In fact, conservatives of all varieties were increasingly determined to
gain political power. Throughout the latter half of the 1950s, conservative
writers emphasized the necessity of political action. Human Events author
Congressman Howard Buffet asserted that the "transcendent political
duty of the citizen" was "vigilance" and that this task should not be left to
politicians. Philosopher Richard Weaver similarly warned of the consequences
of relying on political leaders, who were too willing to compromise.
Notre Dame dean and right-wing organizer Clarence Manion concluded
that "the terrible tide" was "turning" and the "political shot-gun
marriage that Ike performed" was going to be over by 1960.(23)
Worried that eight years of "Liberal Republican" control of the party
had weakened the conservative movement, National Review editor Frank
Meyer still found cause for hope in the new activity on the right, which was
"creating a climate in which conservatism is on the verge of emerging as
the only live option for the intelligent and the independent of the new generation."
Accepting the challenge, the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists,
the Young Republicans, and later the Young Americans for Freedom
began organizing and lobbying for right-wing causes and candidates.(24)
By 1960, most of this activity focused on developing strength within the
Republican Party. As journalist George Sokolsky pointed out, the GOP had
to serve as a "rallying point" for the "angry men" of the country because
there was "no other party." Although both parties were ideologically "confused,
the Democratic Party was a "catchall on every phase of liberal, and
even socialist," views. The Republican Party, on the other hand, had,
according to Human Events author John J. Synon, "lent little aid and comfort
to the collectivists." Conservatives had to build on this trend to ensure
that the party did not slip into the wrong hands.(25)
For their part, Republican conservative politicians worked hard to take
advantage of this sentiment. As Senate Campaign Committee chair, Arizona
senator Barry Goldwater traveled across the country attempting to
bring frustrated voters "back n the party" by convincing them "that their
positions were not contrary to ours."(26) From the standpoint of conservatives,
gaining such support would secure a national platform for achieving
their goals. It would also serve the purposes of Republican conservatives
who had been struggling to win control of their party.
Although these conservative organizations and individuals provided a
natural constituency for the right wing of the GOP, their support created
difficulties. Since they were not elected officials, grassroots conservatives
did not always see the need for, or the wisdom of, compromise. They
could afford to be relentless in their quest for conservative goals; officeholders
could not. Lacking political experience, intellectuals and crusaders
on the right demanded a high price for their support.
Moreover, the diversity of right-wing organizations proved problematical.
How could conservative leaders maintain unity among people with
different goals and backgrounds? For example, although atheist Max
Eastman agreed with Buckley politically, Eastman withdrew his name
from the masthead of the National Review because he found the magazine
too "christian." The widely distributed, oversimplified international
communist conspiracy theory of Robert Welch and his followers created
even greater difficulties. Many people associated with the National Review
disagreed with important parts of the Birchite philosophy. Whereas
Welch blamed communist conspirators for "delivering" Americans to
their "doom," Buckley attributed the dangerous situation to anticommunists
who "tragically misunder[stood] the nature of the crisis" Americans
faced.(27)
The fact that the editors of the National Review worried more than the
average midwestern or southwestern American about these intellectual
subtleties created an additional obstacle to conservative unity. Farmers in
the heartland, oilmen in Texas, academics in Chicago, and a journalist in
New York City might all share the same basic philosophy but interpret that
perspective very differently because of their distinct social and educational
backgrounds. Conservatives had to treat these socioeconomic differences
with care to prevent charges of elitism from undermining their cause.
Surface unity existed by the early 1960s, but underlying theoretical and
practical disagreements continually threatened to disrupt the calm.
Discord was particularly apparent m the political arena. Conservative
Republicans united in opposition to liberal threats but squabbled endlessly
when it came to advancing their own conservative agendas. Power struggles
between strong personalities limited conservative unity, the most obvious
example taking place in California. Both Vice President Richard
Nixon and Senator William Knowland, Republican minority leader, saw
themselves as the spokesperson for the California GOP. Never forgetting
that Knowland had not supported him in his first campaign, Nixon denied
the senator's claim to leadership in the Golden State. This rivalry continued
throughout the 1950S until Knowland lost his gubernatorial
and his power in 1958.(28)
Even those not directly involved in government recognized the danger
of such infighting. Both W. Henry McFarland of the American Committee
and L. Brent Bozell of the National Review implored their readers
join forces with others on the right in order to increase their power. The
calls for unity continued throughout the 1950s.(29)
Of more consequence than disunity was the taint of extremism associated
with groups such as the John Birch Society. With their conspiracy
theories and wild assertions that Eisenhower was a communist agent,
Welch and his organization reinforced the view of many moderates and liberals that everyone on the right was a lunatic. This tendency to view a
conservative thought as extremist developed during the postwar period
for several reasons. Some scholars argued that the United States' lack of
feudal past had prevented the development of an indigenous conservative
movement. Therefore, as many liberal commentators pointed out at that
time, to be a conservative in the United States was an impossibility because
it would mean "conserving" liberalism. Others, pointing to the "intellectual
flabbiness" of American conservatism, portrayed right-wingers
as liberals with an attitude problem. According to this theory, these men
and women zeroed in on the parts of liberal philosophy that they opposed
and ignored the rest.(30) Such viewpoints led to the conviction that in the
United States conservatism amounted to little more than the desire of
businesspeople and the upper classes to maintain the status quo.
Reflecting a second aspect of this argument, others acknowledged the
existence of a conservative faction but defined it solely by its radical elements.
Respected journals such as the New Republic described Goldwater
as "the `white hope' of America's thinning Neanderthal ranks" and his
fellow conservatives as members of the "radical right" and "the crackpot
fringe." Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., also associated the Right with a
single segment of society. In his discussion of "the failure of the right" in
The Vital Center, Schlesinger examined only the business community,
thus excluding all other conservative elements. When he spoke of radicalism,
he associated it with a "confused and frightened business community"
susceptible to fascism rather than rampaging anticommunists or axwielding
moralists.(31)
The Right also was forced to pay for its support of McCarthy's crusade
against the "Red Menace." Daniel Bell, Seymour Lipset, and other commentators
emphasized the irrationality of the McCarthyites' response to
threats from abroad. Most Republicans had applauded the Wisconsin
senator's early attacks on communism in government. When he continued
his investigations during a Republican administration, however, some began
to question his reliability and usefulness.(32) Moderate Republicans
believed that McCarthy's willingness to violate the civil rights of suspects
and his abuse of senatorial privileged undermined the legitimacy of anticommunism
and threatened the reputation of the GOP. Thus, the man who
had made a name for himself fighting alleged radicals came to be perceived
by many Republicans as an extremist who had to be eliminated
before he irreparably damaged the crusade against communism. Censured,
McCarthy lost power, but not until he had introduced an extremist
dynamic within the GOP.
Obviously, part of the problem conservatives faced in establishing
themselves within the GOP and the country was one of definition. Most
Republicans supported a basic platform that stressed local government,
reduced spending, and anticommunism. As a result, ideological differences
among party members became matters of degree; conservatives
wanted greater local responsibility for government, less spending, and a
stronger stand against communism than did party moderates or liberals.
By these criteria from the moderate perspective, someone who articulated
different political or more far-reaching goals or who wanted to enact the
platform more quickly or more thoroughly would be an extremist and
could be legitimately ignored.
Conservatives realized the danger of being labeled "extremist" and
worked to counteract such a perception. Throughout the late 1950s and
early 1960s, various right-wing journalists warned that anti-Semitic and
racist remarks by conservatives undermined their cause. Offering a strategy
for increasing conservative ranks, author Elizabeth Churchill Brown
encouraged Human Events readers to avoid associating with racists and
anti-Semites. Similarly, Buckley cautioned independent publishers that
"racists and crackpots" "discredited" the movement. He also attempted to
convince such fanatics as Nazi George Lincoln Rockwell to give up their
more excessive ideas. In 1960 Buckley denounced the American Mercury
for its anti-semitic posture, which he feared would "gravely damage the
cause of true conservatism." Welch's ideas, however, presented a dilemma.
While Buckley rejected Welch's hypothesis that Eisenhower was a
communist agent, he considered the John Birch Society a worthy organization,
maintained a friendly correspondence with Welch, and supported
his publication, American Opinion, from its beginnings in 1958 into the
early 1960s.(33)
Building on a widespread but unarticulated public dissatisfaction with
government and society, a resurgent intellectual movement, and a mushrooming
network of grassroots groups, conservative Republican politicians
began to develop their own organization within the party. Unlike
Taft, who had scorned the conservative intellectuals, the New Right enjoyed
intimate financial and personalities with these savants, as well as with
the burgeoning conservative press. The resulting interaction gave voice to
long-standing but previously inchoate sentiments. Conservatives soon
discovered that they were not alone, but they confronted a wide range of
opinion on the right. It was their willingness, albeit grudging at times, to
tolerate the breadth of the developing movement that helped to unify the
factions in their assault on the liberal "Eastern Establishment."
This trend toward unity is one of the most important events in the early
development of the conservative movement. The integration of various
right-wing groups during the late 1950s occurred on several levels. Philosophically,
intellectuals with diverse beliefs realized the value of concentrating
on their similarities rather than their differences in the common
fight against liberals. Politically, conservatives of all stripes and socioeconomic
backgrounds rallied around the cause of anticommunism, willingly
overlooking their disagreements in their desire to support McCarthy.
The alliance between conservative intellectuals, grassroots groups, and
right-wing politicians was extremely significant in the long-term development
of the conservative movement. The anger and frustration of citizens
created a substantial bloc of votes and money; the theoreticians and the
press channeled those votes toward support of conservative politicians. By
offering intellectual justifications, thinkers such as Frank Meyer, James
Burnham, and Russell Kirk gave the developing movement the legitimacy
necessary to challenge liberal control of the party.
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